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This dissertation consists of three essays that investigates the effect of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  Chapter 1 is the introduction that 
discuss what my three essays are about.  Chapter 2 is my first essay and it tries to 
answer the question, if there is moral hazards among HIPC member countries while 
they are finishing the program. Chapter 3 uses empirical data to access if one 
country’s HIPC membership have spatial spillover effects. It uses the Spatial Durbin 
Model to estimate the effects of HIPC affiliation on neighboring countries. Chapter 
4 is a joint effort with Dr. Andrew Young. We use the Economic Freedom index and 
the Political Rights index to investigate the change in institutional quality of member 
countries from the time that they enter the HIPC program until the time that they 








My life is not possible without my family. I would like to thank my parents, George
and Suong Schlosky, for their unwavering support in giving me the best education that they
could. They understood the value of human capital and encouraged me to shoot for the
moon, getting a Ph.D. Also, I would like to thank my husband, Serkan Karadas, for his ...
everything. He stood by me as a patient first year graduate student. He tutored me and
helped me passed all of my comprehensive exams. He encouraged me to get to work when
I did not have the motivation. He is my one true love of my life and I thank God everyday
for blessing me with such a great husband.
Second, I would like to thank Dr. Andrew Young for being my teacher, advisor and
dissertation chair. With his guidance, I was able to complete this work. I am very thank-
ful for his advice and patience. I definitely chose the right mentor. I know that I am bit
slow, a little socially awkward, and probably frustrated him from time to time, but he was
patient and did not give up on me. A big part of my success is due to having him to advise me.
I am also thankful to my dissertation committee members: Dr. Brian Cushing, Dr.
Stratford Douglas, Dr. Tami Gurley-Calvez, and Dr. Dongwoo Yoo. I am very happy that
I have them to consult with during my years at West Virginia University. Being a TA for
Dr. Cushing’s Statistics class gave me confidence in the subject and eventually I was able
to teach the class by myself. I try to follow his style (cool but hardworking), and hope to be
able to become a great teacher like him. Dr. Douglas is my econometrics professor and is
someone who I deeply respect. I am thankful for giving me advice on my papers and giving
me a mock interview to help me on the job market. Thank you Dr. Tami Gurley-Calvez for
teaching me Public Finance and thank you for being a great role model. I hope that one
day I can become a great researcher like her. I also would like to thank Dr. Dongwoo Yoo
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
for his help on my papers. During both the dissertation proposal and defense, he gave me
great comments. Also, if I could have a 6th member on my committee, I would have ask
Dr. Lacombe. Dr. Donald Lacombe is the one who taught me Spatial Econometrics. The
skills that I need to work on my second essay. I am very thankful that I took his class, and
that he was the teacher. I couldn’t ask for a better spatial econometrics teacher. Thank you.
While I am in Morgantown, away from my parents, Dr. Neal Newfield and Dr. Susan
Newfield took me under their wings and give me warmth as though I am a part of their
family. Every Thanksgiving I was at their house, and Halloween, and Hanukkah/Christmas,
and all of the special occasions of the year. They are truly good-hearted people. Even when
I moved away, I miss them and think about them often. Another special friend/brother that
I would like to thank is Julian Nguyen. Graduate school and life can be stressful and he
was a brother who would always be there to listen to me. In Morgantown, Neal, Susan, and
Julian are my family. I am grateful for them.
Also, I would like to thank special people who had made a difference in my academic
career. Dr. Sandra Trejos, Dr. Gustavo Barboza, Dr. Lynn Smith, Dr. Rod Raehsler, Dr.
Paul Woodburne, and Dr. Jerry Belloit. They taught me during my undergraduate years at
Clarion University of Pennsylvania. Later I was able to become their colleague for one year
while maintaining a visiting position there. They treated me incredibly well and encouraged
me to finish my dissertation. Thank you. Especially Dr. Trejos, whose hugs mean so much
to me.
Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Parmeter and Dr. Valerien Pede for helping
me with coding in R. Thank you Dr. Parmeter for teaching me how to make reproducible
research. He taught me how to use R, and to integrate Latex with R-Studio using Sweave.
Dr. Pede’s knowledge in spatial econometrics helped me with my second paper. Together,




List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Is There Moral Hazard in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative Debt Relief Process? 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 A Brief Introduction of the Debt Relief Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Hypothesis Development: Moral Hazard in Debt Relief Programs . . . . . . 13
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5.1 Main Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.2 Additional Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Spatial Spillover Effects of Debt Relief from the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative 34
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Background on the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.1 Dependent Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.3 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Econometric Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
CONTENTS v
4 Can Foreign Aid Motivate Institutional Reform?
An Evaluation of the HIPC Initiative 56
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Foreign Aid and Institutional Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 The HIPC Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4 The Record thus Far . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69




2.1 Illustration of the Debt Laffer Curve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Proportional Hazard Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Marginal Effects of Corruption on Interim Duration on different levels of In-
terim Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Marginal Effects of Interim Aid per capita on Interim Duration on different
levels of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Kaplan-Meier Survival Function, Interaction Term of Aid and Corruption . 25
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Variable Description and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 HIPC Decision and Completion Point Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Countries in the Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5 Correlation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Cox Proportional Hazard: Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Cox Proportional Hazard: Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Country List 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Country List 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Descriptive Statistics - 63 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Descriptive Statistics - 56 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Correlation Matrix of Main Variables - 63 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Correlation Matrix of Main Variables - 56 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.7 OLS Regression Results: 63 Countries Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8 OLS Regression Results: 56 Countries Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.9 SLX Regression Results: 63 Countries Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.10 SLX Regression Results: 56 Countries Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.11 SDM Impacts - 63 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.12 SDM Impacts - 56 countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 HIPC Initiative Participants: Decision and Completion Dates . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 HIPC Initiative Participants: Changes in Economic Freedom and Political
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Relationship between Aid and Changes in Economic Freedom during Partici-




As a global effort to increase standardS of living in the world’s poorest nations, the
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower
women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a global
partnership for development.1 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative works
toward those goals along with the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). They were
formed by a joint effort of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The HIPC Initiative set strict criteria for entering and completing the program. As countries
begin the process, they receive interim debt relief. Then, when they finish, they receive a
large package of debt relief that can total hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.
My dissertation is composed of three essays that look at the impacts of the HIPC Initiative
on its participant countries.
The first essay introduces the idea of moral hazard and investigates the extent to which
moral hazard is a problem in the HIPC Initiative. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that
for foreign aid to work, recipient countries need to have high-quality institutions and low
inflation. Most HIPC member countries do not meet these conditions. I use the World
Bank’s measure of corruption to investigate how corruption affects the amount of time that
1As stated on the United Nation’s website: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
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passes between a country entering the HIPC Initiative (the decision point) and its success-
ful completion (the completion point). To infer if there is moral hazard, I look at both the
amounts of interim aid and corruption levels. Intuitively, interim aid is given to participating
countries to help them succeed in implementing structural forms. If, perversely, countries
that receive more interim aid, all else equal, are actually slower to implement the reforms,
then this suggests a moral hazard problem. In particular, it suggests that participants are
more focused on receiving additional interim aid than implementing the reforms. I expect
that high levels of corruption will be associated with greater moral hazard. I also anticipate
a positive relationship between interim aid and time spent in the HIPC Initiative in the
presence of moral hazard. If moral hazard is indeed an important problem in the HIPC
Initiative, then the World Bank and the IMF may be spending more money than they need
to. In addition to the moral hazard analysis, the first essay also provides a comprehensive
study of the factors contributing to the success and failures of the HIPC member countries
in completing the HIPC program.
I employ the Cox Proportional Hazard model to perform a duration analysis. Results
suggest that interim aid has no effect on the length of the interim period. When a squared
term for interim aid is entered into the estimation, it sometimes enters significantly, but
the estimated effect is very small. Higher corruption levels are independently and positively
associated with the interim duration. However, the interaction term between interim aid and
the level of corruption does not have a significant effect on the length of the interim period.
I then conclude, that moral hazard does not seem to be an important problem in the HIPC
Initiative.
The second essay examines the effects of HIPC Initiative debt relief on economic growth
in participant countries and in their neighbors. I employ the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) to
estimate the relationships between economic growth and (i) HIPC Initiative participation,
(ii) the amount of debt relief received during participation, and (iii) the amount of time
that a participant spends between decision and completion points in the HIPC Initiative.
The results indicate that, (i) a country’s participation in the HIPC Initiative has at best no
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effect on its real GDP growth; but the estimated indirect effects are actually always negative
and often statistically significant. Furthermore, (ii) the sign on the amount of debt relief is
statistically significant, indicating that debt relief adversely affects the recipient country’s
growth, and (iii) the time that a country spends in the interim period negatively affects its
GDP per capita.
The final essay a joint effort with Dr. Andrew Young. We examine the effect of partici-
pation in the HIPC Initiative on institutional quality. The HIPC Initiative explicitly aims to
promote policy and institutional reforms. However, there is a growing literature suggesting
that foreign aid (of which HIPC Initiative is a form) has deleterious effects on recipients’
institutions. If the HIPC Initiative does not promote (or perhaps even harms) economic
growth, (as suggested by Essay 2) then a negative effect of debt relief on institutional qual-
ity would be doubly troubling. We examine the relationship between the amount of debt
relief received by HIPC Initiative participants and changes in their Economic Freedom of the
World and Freedom House Political Rights index scores. In general we find that the promise
of the HIPC Initiative to facilitate policy and institutional reforms is largely unfulfilled. A
large portion of HIPC Initiative participants experienced no improvements or even decreases
in institutional quality from decision to completion. Furthermore, a number of countries
experienced backslides in the years subsequent to completing the HIPC Initiative.




Is There Moral Hazard in the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative Debt Relief Process?
2.1 Introduction
Foreign aid is a widely researched topic in the economic development literature. It is of
great interest to answer questions such as What determines the flow of aid?, Does foreign
aid work to achieve its intended goals?, and Are the aid funds misused?, etc. The delivery,
utilization, and success of foreign aid are conditional on a large number of factors. For
example, donors’ intents and recipients’ utilization of the funds can be incongruent, and
there is some anecdotal evidence to corroborate this claim. Consider the case of Nigeria. In
2006 the President of Nigeria, a large foreign aid recipient, reportedly spent $1 million of
poverty alleviation funds to sponsor popular music artists Jay-Z and Beyonce to perform at
a music festival1. Again, in February of 2013, Nigeria spent another $500,000 inviting tabloid
celebrity Kim Kardashian to co-host an event called Love Like A Movie. Clearly, such events
do not help the poor or reduce hunger, which are among the main objectives of foreign aid.
However such events highlight the need for further studies on understanding when and how
foreign aid works. The misuse of funds suggest that there could be a mismatch between
1In 2006, Nigeria received more than $13 billion U.S. in net official development assistance (World Bank)
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foreign aid donors’ intent and the recipients’ use of foreign aid.
In this essay I focus on debt relief as a form of foreign aid and investigate the factors
contributing to its success. According to Cassimon and van Campenhout (2007), debt relief
is a type of multilateral aid that outperforms other modes of aid delivery. They use a panel
vector autoregressive model and find that, in the long run, HIPC debt relief helps reduce fu-
ture loans. They also find that it increases government revenue collection. To make the debt
relief more effective, the IMF and the World Bank created two debt relief programs to help
countries that have exceedingly high levels of debt. These programs are the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The
IMF and World Bank monitor countries that participate in these programs. Participants are
required to submit reports on their macroeconomic conditions and their spending on poverty
reduction programs. By the end of 2010, the HIPC initiative and the MDRI provided $76
billion and $38 billion, respectively, in debt relief in the end-2010 present value (PV) terms.
In this study, I address two issues with respect to the HIPC initiative’s debt relief efforts. I
attempt to infer whether the HIPC initiative suffers from moral hazard problem and I seek
to identify the determinants of the length of the time that it takes a country to successfully
complete the HIPC initiative’s program.
The HIPC initiative involves two stages: the decision point and the completion point.
The time it takes for a country to pass from the decision point into the completion point
is called the interim period. The average interim period for a country participating in the
HIPC initiative is approximately 45 months. However, there is a wide variation in the length
of the interim period across countries. It is not well-understood why it takes so little time
for some countries to complete the HIPC initiative while it takes so long for others. For
example, the time it took for Uganda to reach the completion point was only 3 months, and
Bolivia took 16 months; alternatively, the Democratic Republic of Congo did not complete
the HIPC initiative for 84 months and, Guinea-Bissau took even longer (120 months). Is
there any special reason why these 36 HIPC countries have large differences in interim du-
rations?
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In this paper, I also investigate potential moral hazard problems associated with the
HIPC initiative. In this context, the multilateral donors (organized under the auspices of
the World Bank and IMF) are the principals while the HIPC initiative participants are
agents. The principals not only want to lower the debt burden of these members but they
also aim to make that outcome sustainable by insisting on structural reforms to partici-
pants’ policies and institutions. The principals desire that interim (i.e., during participation
in the HIPC initiative) debt relief be used to promote such reforms. However, the agents
may not desire such reforms (though certainly desiring ultimate forgiveness of their debts!)
and, instead, desire to use the interim funds for other purposes. Indeed, to the extent that
the donors have an ultimate interest in reforms, the agents may have an incentive to delay
reforms in a way that interim aid is provided for a longer period of time; accumulating in a
larger total amount. This study addresses the moral hazard issue in the debt relief process
by investigating whether a country stays in the interim period due to structural reasons
or just to receive more immediate interim relief. Each year, as a country remains in the
interim period, it receives interim aid with the expectation that it will speed up the process
of completing the final requirements to reach the completion point. The longer a country
delays reforms, the longer it stays in the interim period and ultimately receives more cumu-
lative interim aid. Moral hazard occurs when a country stays in the interim period longer to
maximize its interim aid, even though this cumulative amount is subtracted from the final
sum payment at the completion point.
I use survival time analysis to document the factors impacting the interim period in the
HIPC debt relief process and to assess the presence of moral hazard. The duration, measured
in months, starts at the time a country reaches the decision point and ends when it reaches
the completion point. By employing a rich set of explanatory variables, I find that higher
HIPC interim aid, more control of corruption, better rule of law, and higher per capita offi-
cial development aid (ODA) shorten the interim period for a country. On the other hand,
a higher inflation rate and an initial GDP per capita exceeding $1,000 are associated with
longer interim period. Overall, the interim aid, macroeconomic factors, and institutional
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quality play a significant role in the completion of the HIPC program.
In answering whether there is a moral hazard in the HIPC debt relief process, I use
control of corruption, amount of interim aid, and macroeconomic progress to identify sit-
uations under which moral hazard is likely to occur. I use macroeconomic indicators such
as GDP per capita growth, inflation rate, trade level, and net ODA per capita as control
variables because they can impact a country’s standard of living. In my paper, moral hazard
is not directly observed. Since I cannot observe the decision to intentionally stay longer in
the interim period, I argue that countries that receive higher level of interim aid (but still
remain in the interim period) and have poor control of corruption are more likely to commit
moral hazard. I infer the presence of moral hazard if higher amount of interim aid in corrupt
countries is associated with longer interim period. Therefore, I use the interaction between
interim debt relief and the institutional quality variable as the proxy for moral hazard.
This paper contributes to the literature the following ways. First, to the best of my
knowledge, it is the first study documenting the underlying factors contributing to the suc-
cess of the HIPC debt relief effort. Given the size of these debt relief programs, it is critical
to understand why some countries succeed and why some fail. The results in this study offer
a guide to policing the debt relief process more effectively. Second, this paper sheds light on
the moral hazard issue in the debt relief process. Third, it incorporates a duration modeling
methodology from health economics and thus offers new tools for evaluating the different
dimensions of the debt relief efforts.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review on why
some countries are poor, and it compares traditional debt relief and the HIPC initiative. This
section also contains a discussion of debt overhang, the debt Laffer curve, the geography of
the HIPCs, and the importance of institutions in the HIPCs. This literature review highlights
the need for the initiatives such as the HIPC and the MDRI. Section 2.3 discusses the HIPC
and MDRI processes by emphasizing all of the requirements a country must meet in order
to pass each point. Section 2.4 outlines the moral hazard issue in the debt relief process.
Minh Tam Schlosky Chapter 2. Is There Moral Hazard? 8
Section 2.5 introduces and describes the data. Section 2.6 outlines the empirical model,
and Section 2.7 discusses the results. Section 2.8 concludes the paper and provides policy
implications.
2.2 Literature Review
The HIPC initiative was established with the goal of helping its member countries get
out of unsustainable debt levels. So far, there is mixed evidence on the Initiative’s success.
Dagdeviren and Weeks (2001) report that the full debt cancellation has only a small impact
on reducing poverty in the HIPC initiative participants, but they also argue that the for-
mation of the HIPC initiative is a step in the right direction to foster sustainable growth.
Nwachukwu (2008) finds that HIPC debt reliefs’ impact is only marginal and that the coun-
tries will not be able to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Fonchamnyo
(2009) examines the HIPCs that had completed the program and finds that on average, they
had improved in terms of education and investment. However, those improvements may not
be sufficient for meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
Having a high debt level can slow down economic growth and thus make it difficult for
countries with heavy debt burden to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Excess exter-
nal debt accumulation can cause problems such as large debt overhang (Krugman 1988, Sachs
1989, Dooley 1989, and Borzenstein 1990). A country with debt overhang is, as described by
Krugman (1988), “a country that has the expected present value of potential future resource
transfers is less than its debt.” He argues that excessive debt overhang distorts the value of
external debt and discourages new investments. Cohen (1997) and Elbadawi et al. (1996)
find that debt overhang causes weak economic performance. Sachs (2002) suggests that debt
overhang can cause poor countries to fall into a poverty trap. With debtors in a poverty
trap, creditors are unlikely to get repaid. Hence, for a better chance of getting part of their
money back, creditors forgive some debt so that the debtor countries do not slide over to
the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Debt Laffer Curve.
As I show in Figure 2.1, the debt Laffer curve illustrates the debt overhang problem.
To a certain point (let that point be D*), funds borrowed can be repaid. However, after
point D*, the probability of default increases. Kumar and Woo (2010) study a panel of 38
countries from 1970 to 2007 and find an inverse relationship between initial public debt and
long-run growth. Koeda (2008) finds that there is an important link between a country’s
initial economic condition and the effectiveness of debt relief, near the threshold of having
debt overhang. She provides empirical evidence for growth stagnation near this threshold
area. Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) study a panel of 18 countries from 1980 to
2010 and find that economic growth starts to decline when countries reach the threshold
level of 85% of GDP. The Enhanced HIPC initiative sets the debt to export ratio at 150%,
which is well beyond this threshold of 85%.
Claessens (1990) uses the debt Laffer curve to argue that across the board debt cancel-
lations will not be beneficial to creditors. Debt forgiveness only helps the countries whose
debt stocks are on the right side of D*. Hence, canceling those debts for the countries with
D less than D* will not help creditors. Therefore, it makes sense for the HIPC initiative to
place a ratio of debt to exports as a requirement for qualification. The HIPC condition of
debt unsustainability is that the debt to exports ratio must be greater than 150%. Based on
this requirement, I include the debt to export criteria greater than 1.5 as one of the indicator
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variables in this study.
On the moral hazard side, Jeanne et al. (2001) argue that financial safety nets create
moral hazard. They also claim that the cost of international bailouts are not high for the
international community. They suggest that the size of the bailouts should be conditional
on government policies. Ndikumana (2004) presents evidence that countries that received
more aid also received more debt relief compared to those that did not qualify for debt relief.
This leads to the idea that international foreign aid provides incentives for moral hazard to
its recipient countries such that these countries borrow more with the expectation of being
forgiven later.
Isopi and Mattesini (2010) look at the issue of monitoring; they find that donors give
aid without assessing previous performance and continually give more aid without verifying
those results. The lack of a perfect monitoring system in place can be a breeding ground for
moral hazard. Amegashie et al. (2007) propose the use of tied aid as a method of reducing
moral hazard. In summary, foreign assistance can be ineffective if the recipient country either
lacks the appropriate level of rule of law or if a monitoring system is not put in place. As a
way to address these concerns, the HIPC initiative follows the status of recipient countries’
macroeconomic conditions and gives assistance only to those that improved.
To have any meaningful improvements, good institutions are necessary (North, 1990),
because they provide the structure that would reduce transaction costs necessary for ex-
changes. Burnside and Dollar (2000) document that aid is only effective if a country has a
low budget deficit and low inflation, and it is open to trade. However, the countries that
could qualify for HIPC assistance do not have low inflation. This may contribute to longer
interim period. Werlin (2005) argues that it is not possible to help poor countries if they
do not have a good government. Easterly (2002) studies the countries with high debt stocks
and finds that despite repeated deliveries of external aid, those countries continually needed
more help. He argues that these results are due to the irresponsibility of the recipient coun-
tries’ governments. They keep on borrowing because they did not feel threatened from the
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consequences of not performing adequate reforms. Alesina and Weder (2002) find that aid is
not given conditional on governance quality. Actually, more corrupt governments get more
aid.
Knack (2000) documents that aid dependent countries, such as HIPCs, have low institu-
tional quality. Brautigam (2004) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) conclude that high level
of foreign aid can deteriorate the quality of governance by increasing incentives for corrupt
activities. In this study, following the key findings in the literature, I include institutional
variables such as the Control of Corruption index, the Rule of Law index, and the legal origin
of each country in my specifications.
2.3 A Brief Introduction of the Debt Relief Initiatives
The main debt relief initiatives discussed in this paper are the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The HIPC
initiative was launched in 1996 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. The MDRI was launched in 2006 with the goal of providing additional support to
countries participating in the HIPC initiative. Both the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI
provide debt relief to assist countries towards attainment of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
The HIPC initiative calls for the voluntary provision of debt relief by the creditors, who
can be multilateral, bilateral, or commercial. In 1999, to help more countries qualify into the
program, an enhanced HIPC initiative was formed. The enhanced HIPC initiative lowered
the qualification criteria. For example, the debt-to-exports ratio is now 1.5 instead of 2.0 and
the debt-to-fiscal revenue percent is 250% instead of 280%. These downward adjustments
helped more countries become eligible to seek debt relief via the HIPC initiative. A 2003
evaluation by the World Bank and the IMF finds that the initiative greatly reduced the debt
burden of qualified HIPCs.2
2http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/debt/eng/
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The HIPC initiative debt relief differs from normal official development aid in that the
former places numerous criteria for candidate countries to qualify for the HIPC program.
Candidate countries must satisfy a certain level of indebtedness to enter the program and
must demonstrate a firm commitment to reforms before they pass from the decision point
into the completion point. For example, requirements that Togo had to fulfill to reach the
completion point included developing a mechanism to track public expenditures, appointing
judges to the Court of Accounts, and publishing reports auditing government’s expendi-
tures and revenues.3 Bolivia passed the decision point by implementing custom reforms,
approving a new tax procedures code, and creating a single treasury account with enhanced
transparency and expenditure control.4 By the end of 2011, 32 countries reached the com-
pletion point and four countries achieved the decision point. I provide a complete list of
countries and their date of admittance to the HIPC program in Table 4.1.
The HIPC initiative funding process is divided into two stages: Decision and completion
point. To potentially be eligible for HIPC initiative debt relief, a country must satisfy the
following conditions: (1) it is International Development Association-only (IDA) and Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility-eligible (PRGF), (2) the debt burden by end-December 2004
must be above the threshold of 150% for the present value of debt to exports of goods and
services ratio, and 250% for the ratio of present value of debt to fiscal revenue. For (1), the
countries must be the ones that are eligible for loans from the IDA and for the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility. This means that, if left on their own, they will not be able
to get to a sustainable debt level. For (2), the country must have the ratio of exports of
goods and services to GDP, and the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP above 30% and 15%, re-
spectively. In addition to these two requirements, the country must begin a reform program
supported by the IMF and IDA. After passing this stage, the country reaches the decision
point.
3Togo’s IMF completion point document. January 2011.
4Bolivia’s completion point document, 2001.
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The completion point entry is determined by the Executive Board of IDA and IMF. To
pass, a country must have (a) debt burden indicators above the HIPC threshold for the
year prior, (b) established a satisfactory track record of policy performance under the IMF
and IDA supported programs, and (c) put together a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP).5 The PRSP is the document that lays out the actions that countries will take to
reduce poverty and implement policy reform. It is developed based on each country’s specific
situation. The HIPC participants must have their strategies endorsed by the IMF and the
World Bank board. If a country satisfies all of these conditions, it will receive irrevocable
debt relief. It is eligible for 100% debt relief owed to the AfDB, IDA, and the IMF under
the MDRI.
2.4 Hypothesis Development: Moral Hazard in Debt
Relief Programs
In order to qualify as a HIPC recipient, a country must show signs of improvement. Moral
hazard is present when the incentives to receive the debt relief overcome the incentives to
reform. Once a country gets past the HIPC decision point then it may have an incentive to
try and remain in the interim period longer to maximize the amount of interim debt relief
that it receives. A HIPC initiative participant receives interim aid to help them get into
successfully reach the completion point. The interim aid is based on the participant demon-
strating (through its own reports) the achievement of certain macroeconomic and structural
outcomes. Participants, therefore, may have an incentive to manipulate the process such
that they continue to receive interim aid disbursements while actually prolonging the time
until the ultimate completion.
Incentives for moral hazard can arise from the receipt of interim relief. However, there
are actually two ways moral hazard can happen: from the provision of (1) interim assistance
5Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and it can be in the form of an Interim PRSP, PRSP preparation
status report, full-PRSP, or PRSP-Annual Progress Report.
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and (2) topping up aid.6 For (1) when a HIPC participant stays longer in the interim pe-
riod, it receives more interim aid cumulatively. For (2), longer interim duration can change
the amount of aid needed by the HIPC member due to extraordinary circumstances that
arise. The HIPC initiative agrees on the amount of the debt relief package at the decision
point. However, on its path to complete the HIPC program, if unforeseen circumstances
cause a country to need more aid, the HIPC initiative will give “topping up” aid. Hence,
by lengthening the interim period, opportunities to receive topping up aid increases. Due to
data limitations, I will only be focusing on the interim aid in this paper.
At the decision point, countries are assessed, and debt reliefs are provided on a case by
case basis. The Executive Board determines the aid flowing to each country, in millions of
US dollars. These payouts are high; however, the countries can receive more interim aid by
improving gradually while preparing the PRSP to qualify for the completion point. That
will maximize their cumulative interim aid amount. At the completion point, all of 100% of
their debt prior to 2004 will be irrevocably forgiven.
I do not have a direct measure of moral hazard. Researchers across different fields tackle
this problem by identifying the situations under which moral hazard is most likely to oc-
cur. In the context of the HIPC initiative participants, moral hazard occurs when countries
stay intentionally longer in the interim period to maximize their interim aid. To determine
whether there is moral hazard, I use both the interim debt relief amount and the control
of corruption index by Kaufmann et al. (2010). The control of corruption index identifies
countries with lax controls of corruption. This index captures how the ruling class is per-
ceived to use their political power to extract private gains for themselves. In this regard, a
higher corruption level in a recipient country may be the reason its duration in the interim
period is longer. Poor governance may lead to the country not being able to fulfill the HIPC
completion requirement. Furthermore, poor governance can lead to the stretching of the in-
terim period for more interim aid because the money went somewhere else instead of gearing
towards poverty reduction and policy reforms.
6Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Niger received topping up aid from the HIPC initiative
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For a given HIPC initiative participant, we can argue for the presence of moral hazard
if (1) high corruption leads to longer interim period and (2) the interim aid received has no
effect on, or lengthens, the interim duration, after controlling for macroeconomic factors and
conflict. For (1) it is obvious that high corruption can thwart policy reform thus lengthening
the interim period. For (2) the interim aid that is meant to shorten the interim duration
fail to accomplish that goal. I will conclude that there is possible moral hazard if both of
these two conditions hold, even when I control for macroeconomic circumstances such as
high inflation, or the presence of conflict. That means the longer interim period is not the
result of macroeconomic hardship but something else, and that something else may be moral
hazard. To infer the presence of moral hazard, I focus on the interaction term between
interim debt relief and corruption (or low rule of law). If the interaction term points to a
longer interim period, I interpret it as evidence for moral hazard.
2.5 Data
As of December 2010, there were 36 HIPC countries, 32 passed and four were still in the
interim period. Due to some missing information, the multivariate analysis that I perform
will only include 33 countries. The countries that I omit are Afghanistan, Benin, and Sao
Tome Principe. The dependent variable in this study is the length of the interim period,
timemo, which I measure in months as the distance between the decision point and the
completion point. Because my explanatory variables include time varying covariates, I need
to break each country into separate observations. I calculate each country’s individual cu-
mulative months, timemo, by taking the difference between the end year t with its date of
entry into the program. For example, Ethiopia entered the initiative in November of 2001
and completed in April of 2004, then for the year 2001 the timemo is 2 (November and
December), for the year 2002 it is 14, for 2003, it is 26, and for 2004, it is 30.
The right hand side include the main explanatory variables interim debt relief, insti-
tutional quality (policy) variables, interactions between debt relief and policy, and other
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control variables. The main explanatory variables are the interim HIPC debt relief amount
per capita and the institutional quality variables such as the Control of Corruption index,
and the Rule of Law index. I multiplied the Control of Corruption index and the Rule of
Law index by negative one, so that instead of measuring less corruption, it now measures
more corruption, and instead of better rule of law, now higher numbers indicate lower rule
of law. Overall, countries with lower governance quality will have lower policy index.
I incorporate additional control variables to account for factors such as macroeconomic
status and geography. Macroeconomic status variables include the inflation rate, the debt
service to GNI ratio, the initial GDP per capita value, net official development aid (per
capita), openness to trade, real GDP per capita growth, and the revised Polity score measure.
The geographic characteristics control variable group incorporates indicator variables to
reflect if a country is in the African continent, or if it is high in terms of absolute latitude.
Remaining control variables are the indicator variables “conflict” and “Original HIPC ”. A
summary of all variable descriptions and sources are listed in Table 2.1.
2.5.1 Main Variables
The World Bank and the IMF provide yearly “Status of Implementation” reports on
the HIPC initiative and the MDRI that include yearly debt relief amounts to each recipient
country. The amount of debt relief, in millions of US dollars, are provided by these HIPC
initiative and MDRI reports. The report also lists the dates that each country is admitted
to the decision point stage, and when they reach the completion point. The duration passed
between the decision point and the completion point is called the interim period, and it is
calculated in months. This variable “timemo” is duration data that has a non-normal dis-
tribution; hence, linear regressions cannot be used. Overall, the main explanatory variables
in this study are: (1) the interim amount of debt relief that each country receives, (2) the
policy variable (corruption or rule of law).
The institutional quality variables I use to test for the presence of moral hazard are the
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Control of Corruption index and the Rule of Law index. I employ these variables to estimate
the effect of institutions on the likelihood of a country’s success in the HIPC initiative process.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009 ) estimate these variables in a World Bank study.
According to Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009), Control of Corruption measures how
prevalent the public perceives the use of official power for enhancing private gains. The Rule
of Law index is a measure of the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
the courts, and the possibility of crime and violence. These variables are multiplied by -1 to
give them the opposite meaning, so that when I control for the interaction terms (interim
aid * institutional quality), they will be easier to interpret. A low “control of corruption”,
after multiply by -1, will mean higher “corruption” (lack of control). Therefore, in my data
set, a high value for the “corrupt” variable means higher corruption.
2.5.2 Additional Control Variables
I need to separate the effects of net official development aid (ODA) from HIPC interim
debt relief. Since yearly interim aid is not the single source of financial assistance that HIPC
participants receive, I also include their net official development aid in the analysis. Net of-
ficial development aid (ODA) exceeds interim HIPC debt relief by far each year. The mean
net ODA these countries receive is $74.137 millions per year.
The current macroeconomic status of a country in the HIPC program will affect its abil-
ity to exit the interim period. The HIPC initiative requires improvements in macroeconomic
performance and structural reforms on the part of participants. I expect that a country
spending most of its revenue on repaying accumulated debt will not have the resources to
put into implementing its PRSP. Therefore, I create a new variable called debttogni to control
for debt service as a proportion of national output. I also control for income by including
the real GDP per capita growth. I control for the openness of a country by including the
Openness to Trade variable from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012). It is calculated by
totaling exports and imports then dividing it by the real GDP per capita, in constant prices.
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For the democracy measure, I use the Combined Polity score from the Polity IV Project
Data set from Marshall and Jaggers (2011). The combined polity score shows how autocratic
or democratic a country is. The measure ranges from +10, which is strongly democratic,
to -10, which is strongly autocratic. It is essential to include this control variable because
a more autocratic government will be able to move resources more quickly, or restructure
government expenditure patterns better to accomplish their goals and pass to the completion
point. However, autocratic regimes will also be more susceptible to corruption.
A country in conflict will be less likely to exit the HIPC program because of social unrest.
I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research data
set to separate out countries experiencing a conflict during year t. The conflict variable
equals 1 for a country in conflict and 0 otherwise.
I control for the starting status of the HIPC countries by using the initial value of their
real GDP per capita. I expect that a country started out in an inferior position would need
more time to complete the interim requirements. This is a level measurement, not a cate-
gorical dummy variable.
Also, I control for countries starting the HIPC process before the Enhanced HIPC initia-
tive relaxed its criteria. The variable ‘original’ captures the advantage that a country gets
from entering the initiative early. These original countries re-entered the new initiative, (i.e,
the Enhanced HIPC initiative,) at the decision point, and some of their previous accomplish-
ments may help them reach the completion point faster. The ten original HIPCs are Benin,
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and
Uganda.
Following Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), I include geographic characteristics of the
HIPC countries. I select two indicator variables to control for differences in their geography:
absolute latitude and African continent. The African variable takes a value of 1 if it is located
in the African continent and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, African countries get additional debt
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relief from the African Development Bank; hence, I insert a dummy variable for a country
being in the African continent. Also, I use the absolute latitude measure by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishney (1999), who use the capital city as a reference point.
The values for this measure range between zero and one. The lower the value, the closer
the country is to the equator. According to Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), countries
closer to the tropics experience harder times in economic development.
2.6 Econometric Model
I use the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model, a type of duration analysis.
Duration models are useful for measuring the risk of an event happening, and for this paper,
reaching the completion point is the event. The time that it takes for a country to go from
the decision point to the completion point is the dependent variable in this study is the
interim duration in months, timemo. The advantages of hazard models are their ability to
deal with censored data and that they produce hazard rates. I have right censored data with
4 out of the 36 countries not having an end spell. The ending result of the analysis gives me
an understanding of which determinants cause longer interim durations.
Survival time models are usually used in medical studies that examine various factors
affecting a person’s chance of survival over a period time. Probability of dying is the fail-
ure rate, and the failure to survive results in death. Survival time models are designed for
the analysis of time duration data, and they help with this study thanks to their ability to
measure the probability of a determinant causing a country to travel from one state to the
other, namely in or out of the interim period. Therefore, the event is reaching completion
point and the duration is measured as months spent in the interim period.
Studies that have used duration models include Douglas (1998), Bruce, Barbour, and
Thacker (2004). Douglas (1998) uses this duration analysis to investigate the determinants
of cigarette smoking. Bruce, Barbour, and Thacker (2004) use a duration model to find
determinants that affect the welfare reentry rates. They find that black, single, or less edu-
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cated individuals are more likely to return to welfare after they exited the program (shorter
off-welfare durations). Studies using specifically the Cox proportional hazard model include
Ragusa (2010), Kluver and Sagarzazu (2013), and Fogarty, Jalalzai, Hankinson (2013). Ra-
gusa (2010) uses the Cox proportional hazard model to conduct an event history analysis on
the lifecycle of public policy. The duration is from the time an existing legislation is repealed
to the time that is enacted (the event). He finds that the three determinants that affect the
policy life are a divided party control, previous repeals, and political polarization. Kluver
and Sagarzazu (2013) used the Cox model to study decision-making speed by the European
Union legislative bodies. They find that ideological distance lengthens the duration of policy
making across proposals. Fogarty, Jalalzai, and Hankinson (2013) use the Cox model to
study the duration of a widow’s career in the United States House of Representative after
their husbands have passed away. Using the hazard rates, they find that the determinants
that matter are age, region, and majority/minority margins.
In my paper, the survival time function, S(t), estimates effects of various variables on
the probability of a country exiting the interim period in a point in time, given that it has
not exited yet. Here, t is the current time, and T is the ending time, which is the year at
which a country enters the completion point. X is a vector of explanatory variables that
include all control variables. Some explanatory variables are time dependent, which means
they change with time. Therefore, they are time-varying. My data is right censored, which
means that a few countries did not get to the completion point.
Using Cox model, I can make full use of all of my countries by splitting the countries
into many observations; one observation for each year. To adapt time-varying covariates, I
split countries up. For example, Burundi entered the decision point August of 2005. At the
end of the year 2005, Burundi’s interim period is 5 months (August, September, October,
November, December), it receives a 0 in the dummy variable complete for not having com-
pleted the program. It had certain macroeconomic conditions, and it received some amount
of interim aid and net ODA that year. Next year, Burundi receives a 17 for the interim pe-
riod (5 from the year 2005 and another 12 months for the year 2006), and it had a different
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set of numbers for macroeconomic variables and aid amounts. By the time that Burundi
completed the process in 2009, it receives a 1 for complete, and that signifies that it exits
the program. For the year 2009, Burundi get a new set of macroeconomic and aid measures.
Hence, even though Burundi is only one country, it corresponds to five different observations
(one for each year: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009) in the data set.
There are two options when using survival time model. The first one is proportional
hazard, and the second one is accelerated failure time model. The accelerated failure time
model assumes that the hazard will accelerate or decelerate. The proportional hazard model
assumes that the baseline hazard rate is the same for all countries, but can vary with time. To
indicate whether a proportional hazard or an accelerated failure time survival model should
be used, I run proportional hazard tests for all model specifications. The results show no
evidence against the assumption of proportionality of hazards. Therefore, I choose to use
the Cox proportional hazard model. Figure 2.2 shows the plot of the Schoenfeld residuals
versus log(time). When the Beta(t) curve does not deviate far from the zero line, we have
proportional hazard.
The Cox model is characterized by a hazard and a survival function.
Hazard function: h(t) = ho(t)
exp(Xβ)
Survival function: S(t) = So(t)
exp(Xβ)
The survival time study use hazard rates as an output. The hazard rate depends on
the conditional probability of exiting the interim period at a given time. In other words,
the hazard function, h(t), is the instantaneous failure rate. Given that country i has not
exited the interim period, the probability that it would happen the next period is P(t≤
T≤t+∆—t≥T). The failure function is F(t)=P(T≤t). The probability of surviving is its
complement, 1 minus the failure rate S(t) = P(T > t)=1-F(t).
I convert my results to coefficients instead of hazard probabilities for ease of interpreta-
tion. The Cox proportional hazard model coefficients are explained by their signs. Negative
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Figure 2.2: Proportional Hazard Test



























coefficients indicate increased survival time; hence, increased interim period. Positive coef-
ficients means decreased survival time and lessened duration.
2.7 Results
I provide regression results for the survival time analyses in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7.
Although, the models differ in policy variables; they produce consistent outcomes: covari-
ates that produce positive coefficients are the amount of interim aid in billions, net ODA
in billions, interim aid in billions squared, and the dummy variable Original. In a propor-
tional hazard model, we look at the increased or decreased hazards. A higher hazard gives
a positive coefficient, which indicates shorter duration. Hence, positive coefficient variables
are helping the countries speed up to the completion point. Covariates that have negative
coefficients are the policy variables (corruption and low rule of law), interaction variables
between interim aid and policy, interaction between interim aid squared and policy, higher
debt service to GNI ratio, being more open to trade, and in some instances, being located in
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the African continent. These variables contribute to the lengthening of the duration period.
When a model include interaction variables, we need to interpret them according to their
marginal effects. When we have y = βo + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x1x2 + ε, the marginal effect of
x1 is β1 + β2x2.
7 I show their marginal effects in Figure 2.3 for corruption and Figure 2.4
for InterimAid. In the figure, the solid lines represent the marginal effect while the dashed
lines shows their 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Corruption on Interim Duration on different levels of Interim
Aid

























Interim aid has no effect on duration . It is only statistically significant 1 in 4 regressions,
and when it is statistically significant, it is negative. This result is surprising since shortening
the interim duration is the sole purpose of interim aid provision. However, interim aid is
significant if it is squared (again, negative), which implies that more interim aid can cause
longer duration. Institutional variables of corruption and low rule of law increase interim
7For more information, see Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses by Bram-
bor, Clark, and Golder. 2006. Political Analysis 14, 63-82.
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Figure 2.4: Marginal Effects of Interim Aid per capita on Interim Duration on different levels
of Corruption


































duration. This is not surprising because lower institutional quality can lead to inefficient use
of time, capital, interim aid which lengthens interim duration.
The interaction between HIPC aid and corruption yields a statistically insignificant neg-
ative coefficient. Figure 2.5 illustrates the survival functions of two group of countries, one
with higher interim aid and higher corruption vs. one with low interim aid and lower cor-
ruption. The location of the curves suggest that countries with relatively higher aid and
corruption survive longer. This indicates that countries with lower corruption finish more
quickly. However, since the interaction term is not statistically significant, I do not find any
evidence in favor of moral hazard.
As a further robustness check, I also regress the interaction between Interim Aid squared
and Corruption (low rule of law) and received the same result of statistically insignificant
coefficients. The effect of aid is not as strong as corruption or the rule of law. Countries with
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Figure 2.5: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function, Interaction Term of Aid and Corruption
.





































lower rule of law or higher corruption level stay in the interim period longer. However, since
both results (aid x institution and aid squared x institution) are statistically insignificant,
they suggest that there is not moral hazard.
Macroeconomic status variables yield mixed results. Initial GDP level does not have an
effect on duration. High inflation, higher real GDP per capita growth, and higher combined
polity score are statistically insignificant. And surprisingly, having conflict (war) in a country
does not affect its ability to reach the completion point. Countries with higher debt service
to GNI have longer interim period, while countries receiving more official development aid
finish earlier.
Countries that joined the HIPC program under the original framework also reach the
completion point faster. They have more time to implement their PRSP strategies. How-
ever, one unexpected result is the negative coefficient from Openness to Trade. Countries
with higher exports perform worse in term of reaching the completion point. Geography
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does not have a consistent effect on interim duration. Absolute latitude is not statistically
significant and the African country indicator variable only has an effect sporadically.
The results show that interim aid does not affect interim duration even though it is
provided to help shorten the interim duration. And, countries with better (poorer) control
of corruption stay shorter (longer) in the interim period. Interaction terms between interim
debt relief and institutional quality are not statistically significant; therefore, I do not find
evidence of moral hazard.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper has three main objectives: (1) finding cross-country characteristics that de-
termine HIPC interim duration, (2) connecting the institutional quality of each country with
the ability to exit the HIPC program, and (3) investigating if there exists any moral haz-
ard in the HIPC initiative debt relief process. After testing each objective and receiving
consistent result using two different policy variables, I have the following findings: (1) Char-
acteristics that lead to longer interim period are higher corruption, lower rule of law, higher
debt service to GNI ratio, being more open to trade, and being in the African continent.
(2) The ability for each country to exit the decision point is tied to institutional quality.
Both policy variables (corruption and low rule of law) resulted in negative coefficients; thus
longer interim period. (3) I do not find evidence of moral hazard due to the fact that the
interaction term (between aid and institutional quality) is statistically insignificant.
This study presents an analysis into the issue of the effectiveness of the HIPC aid and
the incentives for moral hazard in the HIPC debt relief literature. The modest contribution
that this paper makes is the revelation that the interim aid provided by the IMF and the
World Bank does not accomplish the goal of shorter interim period. Since high corruption
and a low rule of law are associated with longer interim period, I recommend that the IMF
and the World Bank pay more attention to institutional quality of the recipient countries.
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Table 2.1: Variable Description and Sources
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variable
Time in months Running total number of months coun-
try i has been in the Decision Point of
the HIPC Program.
World Bank document: Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initia-
tive and Multilateral Debt Relief Ini-
tiative (MDRI) - Status of Implemen-
tation and Proposals for the Future of
the HIPC Initiative. November 8, 2011.
Main Variables of Interest
HIPC Interim Aid Yearly HIPC interim aid in billions. Calculated by the author from data ob-
tained in the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund yearly reports
Corruption Control of corruption estimate measures
the perceptions of corruption in the
country (using public power for private
gain) x -1
World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
HIPCaid x Corruption interaction variable: HIPC Interim Aid
x Corruption
calculated by the author
Low ROL Rule of law estimate measures the confi-
dence that citizens have in and abide by
the rules of society (how much is prop-
erty rights protected?) x -1
World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
HIPCaid x Low ROL interaction variable: HIPC Interim Aid
x ROL
calculated by the author
Macroeconomic Status Variables
In original HIPC framework Dummy variable: 1 if the country
started in the original HIPC framework
World Bank documents
initial GDP per capita Real GDP per capita of country i dur-
ing the first year it enters the Decision
Point.
In conflict value of 1 if country is in a conflict, 0
otherwise
UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database
inflation Inflation rate (growth rate of GDP im-
plicit deflator).
World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
Debt Service to GNI Total debt service as a percentage of
GNI. Debt repayments and interests.
World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
Net ODA in billions Net official development aid, in billions World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
openness higher openness to trade. Exports
plus imports, divided by real GDP per
capita, in constant price.
Heston, Summers, Aten (2012)
GDP per capita growth Per Capita GDP growth World Bank: The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators. Kauffman et al (2009)
Revised Polity Revised Combined Polity Score Polity IV Project Data Set. (Marshall
& Jaggers 2011)
Geography Variables
Africa value 1 if country is located in the
African continent, 0 otherwise
author made by looking at the world
map
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Table 2.2: HIPC Decision and Completion Point Dates
Country Name Decision Point Date Completion Point Date




Burkina Faso Jul-00 Apr-02
Burundi Aug-05 Jun-09
Cameroon Oct-00 Jul-10
Central African Republic Sep-07 Jun-09
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Jul-03 Jul-10
Congo, Rep. of Mar-06 Jan-10
Ethiopia Nov-01 Apr-04















Sao Tome and Principe Dec-00 Mar-07
Senegal Jun-00 Apr-04










Source: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt
Relief Initiative (MDRI) - Status of Implementation and Proposals for the Future
of the HIPC Initiative. November 8, 2011.
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Table 2.3: Countries in the Data Set
Country Name Total Relief (millions) Included
Afghanistan $ 1,319 No
Benin $ 1,604 No
Bolivia $ 4,889 Yes
Burkina Faso $ 2,160 Yes
Burundi $ 1,474 Yes
Cameroon $ 6,209 Yes
Central African Republic $ 1,110 Yes
Congo, Democratic Republic of $ 16,273 Yes
Congo, Republic of $ 1,934 Yes
Ethiopia $ 6,584 Yes
Gambia, The $ 498 Yes
Ghana $ 7,405 Yes
Guinea Bissau $ 790 Yes
Guyana $ 2,063 Yes
Haiti $ 1,175 Yes
Honduras $ 3,723 Yes
Liberia $ 4,861 Yes
Madagascar $ 4,315 Yes
Malawi $ 3,224 Yes
Mali $ 2,904 Yes
Mauritania $ 1,990 Yes
Mozambique $ 6,347 Yes
Nicaragua $ 6,413 Yes
Niger $ 2,264 Yes
Rwanda $ 1,835 Yes
Sao Tome Principe $ 334 No
Senegal $ 3,339 Yes
Sierra Leone $ 1,664 Yes
Tanzania $ 6,842 Yes
Togo $ 360 Yes
Uganda $ 5,474 Yes
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
InterimAid 147 4.437 13.967 0.000 1.801 161.612
corrupt 147 0.814 0.374 −0.310 0.887 1.484
lowrol 147 0.923 0.469 −0.163 1.038 1.629
original 147 0.224 0.419 0 0 1
inflation 147 9.722 12.416 −20.627 6.208 95.853
netoda 147 74.137 56.777 5.899 58.955 355.337
polity 147 2.027 4.578 −6 5 9
openness 147 66.431 29.058 26.335 61.293 182.129
AbsLat 147 0.503 0.502 0 1 1
debtsvc 147 4.161 11.161 0.552 2.356 135.247
conflict 147 0.088 0.285 0 0 1
africa 147 0.884 0.321 0 1 1
initGDPpc 147 1,270.801 798.763 255.748 1,028.174 3,566.994
rGDPpcg 147 1.515 4.521 −15.306 1.169 29.104
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Table 2.6: Cox Proportional Hazard: Corruption
Months in the Interim Period
time





corrupt −2.406∗∗∗ −3.155∗∗∗ −2.602∗∗∗ −5.427∗∗∗
(0.860) (1.076) (0.861) (1.330)
initGDPpc −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
rGDPpcg −0.008 0.003 −0.014 −0.078
(0.079) (0.064) (0.084) (0.092)
inflation −0.001 −0.006 0.006 −0.018
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030)
debtsvc −0.316∗ −0.121 −0.273 −0.363∗
(0.185) (0.141) (0.179) (0.214)
netoda 0.026∗∗∗ 0.010 0.019∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
polity −0.016 −0.110 −0.026 −0.068
(0.057) (0.072) (0.057) (0.064)
openness −0.016 −0.001 −0.028∗∗ −0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
original 2.657∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 2.926∗∗∗
(0.823) (0.719) (0.818) (0.866)
conflict 1.246 0.486 1.200 1.286
(0.861) (0.832) (0.857) (0.889)
africa −3.443∗∗∗ −2.695∗∗∗ −3.967∗∗∗ −3.903∗∗∗
(1.191) (0.880) (1.121) (0.923)
AbsLat −0.892 −0.314 −0.628 −0.961







PHazard global test p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10
Observations 147 147 147 147
R2 0.368 0.243 0.366 0.412
Max. Possible R2 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766
Log Likelihood −73.134 −86.424 −73.391 −67.818
Wald Test 46.350∗∗∗ 33.770∗∗∗ 46.120∗∗∗ 41.900∗∗∗
LR Test 67.549∗∗∗ 40.969∗∗∗ 67.035∗∗∗ 78.181∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 94.153∗∗∗ 94.575∗∗∗ 90.724∗∗∗ 93.791∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are in parenthesis
Negative coefficients mean lower hazard.
Lower hazard implies a longer duration.
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Table 2.7: Cox Proportional Hazard: Rule of Law
Months in the Interim Period
time





lowrol −2.942∗∗∗ −3.422∗∗∗ −2.831∗∗∗ −3.839∗∗∗
(0.746) (1.198) (0.731) (1.193)
initGDPpc −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
rGDPpcg −0.055 −0.047 −0.050 −0.077
(0.088) (0.091) (0.092) (0.096)
inflation −0.010 −0.014 0.007 −0.011
(0.030) (0.031) (0.021) (0.029)
debtsvc −0.386∗∗ −0.346∗ −0.370∗ −0.408∗
(0.195) (0.202) (0.198) (0.214)
netoda 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
polity −0.077 −0.069 −0.076 −0.091
(0.060) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060)
openness −0.013 −0.013 −0.031∗∗ −0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
original 2.636∗∗∗ 2.823∗∗∗ 2.854∗∗∗ 2.811∗∗∗
(0.768) (0.821) (0.784) (0.827)
conflict 1.854∗∗ 1.731∗ 1.721∗ 1.814∗
(0.898) (0.916) (0.894) (0.926)
africa −3.948∗∗∗ −3.888∗∗∗ −4.574∗∗∗ −4.127∗∗∗
(1.117) (1.078) (1.176) (1.071)
AbsLat −1.543∗∗ −1.528∗∗ −1.060∗ −1.387∗∗







PHazard global test p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10 p ¿ 0.10
Observations 147 147 147 147
R2 0.411 0.414 0.400 0.415
Max. Possible R2 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766
Log Likelihood −67.985 −67.607 −69.322 −67.564
Wald Test 48.190∗∗∗ 47.300∗∗∗ 47.400∗∗∗ 44.110∗∗∗
LR Test 77.846∗∗∗ 78.603∗∗∗ 75.174∗∗∗ 78.689∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 92.808∗∗∗ 94.335∗∗∗ 89.759∗∗∗ 93.186∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Negative coefficients mean lower hazard.
Lower hazard implies a longer duration.
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Chapter 3
Spatial Spillover Effects of Debt
Relief from the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
3.1 Introduction
Every year billions of dollars of aid is provided to nations in need to help them increase
their standard of living. According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), $127.3
billion of net official development aid (ODA) was disbursed in 2010. Foreign aid can be given
as loans, grants, and debt relief. Unfortunately, many countries obtain such a large amount
of loans that they are unable to repay them back without borrowing more. Eventually,
their outstanding balance becomes a shadow that haunts them. Krugman (1988) describes
this condition as a debt overhang problem. Debt overhang is an important issue because
debt-ridden countries will have trouble attracting new investments, and they have to direct
resources to repay their oversized debt. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) identify two
channels through which public debt overhang leads to lower growth; they are private invest-
ments and risk premium on the interest rates government debt.
This situation is similar to a corporation taking on so much debt that it becomes im-
possible to service the debt payments and hence, it files for bankruptcy. When a country
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is in this situation, the HIPC Initiative is there to provide assistance to them. The Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’s goal is to alleviate the debt burden of these
countries so that they can accomplish the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These
goals cover a wide array of well-being measures, such as the eradication of extreme poverty
and hunger, and combat against HIV/AIDS and malaria.
Past research has indicated that spatial correlation should be considered when analyzing
the impacts of public policy (Lacombe, 2004). When the correlation parameters are not
zero, then the least-squares method yields biased and inconsistent estimates. I test my data
set and find spatial correlations; hence, I use a spatial econometric methods to investigate
the impact of the HIPC debt relief efforts. In particular, my paper looks at the amount
of debt relief that each country receives from HIPC Initiative and investigates whether it
positively, or negatively, affects the recipient nation’s GDP per capita, and whether its effect
carries over to its surrounding neighbors. I employ the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) to find
the answer. The SDM regression results reveal a correlation between GDP per capita of
neighboring countries. Furthermore, there are spillover effects of the HIPC membership into
nearby countries. When country i is part of the HIPC Initiative, neighboring country j ’s
GDP per capita suffers.
Using spatial analysis to investigate international spillover effects is a relatively new con-
tribution. Murdoch and Sandler (2001) find long-run and short-run effects of civil wars on
income per-capita growth in the host country and its neighbors. They find that there are
spillover effects to the neighboring countries. The effects are stronger in the short-run com-
pared to the long-run. Their policy implication is that countries neighboring civil war stricken
countries also need foreign assistance. Therefore, a conflict (war) is a channel through which
one country’s situation can affect the neighbor’s GDP.
Another channel that affects income level is institutional quality (North (1990), Gwart-
ney et al. (1999), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Young and Sheehan
(2014)). Kelejian, Murrell, and Shepotylo (2008) use the Spatial Autocorrelation (SAC)
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model to examine spatial spillovers between countries in the development of institutions.
They employ a counter-factual way of looking at the direct and indirect effects of spatial
spillovers. Their conclusion is that, in the long run, governance quality spills outside of the
country’s borders. A possible policy implication of their paper is to encourage and incen-
tivize institutional development in both recipient and neighboring countries. Hosseini and
Kaneko (2012) find spatial spillovers of good governance, government effectiveness, and rule
of law.
Another spillover channel is foreign investments. Shepotylo (2010) provides evidence
that there are spatial links in foreign direct investment (FDI) between a recipient country
and its neighbors. They argue that FDI models are misspecified if they omit spatial effects
of FDI flows. He uses a Spatial AutoRegressive (SAR) model and finds spatial spillovers
more in disaggregate data. With 1993-2007 data, he runs the SAR and the Spatial Error
Model (SEM) using the Maximum Likelihood method. His paper estimates the degree of spa-
tial spillovers of FDI and influence of foreign market potential on FDI in transition countries.
This paper expands the field of international development by using a spatial economet-
rics model to shed light on the issue of whether HIPC debt relief brings benefit or harm
to recipient countries and their neighbors. I use a spatial weight matrix that account for
neighbors, in term of geographical location. Proximity to a country receiving a large debt
relief package can affect the surrounding countries. I provide the correct direct and indirect
effects estimates according to LeSage and Pace (2009). After the effects are estimated, the
results seem to suggest that HIPC membership has negative effects on its recipient country
and surrounding neighbors.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the HIPC and MDRI debt relief
initiatives. Section 3.3 describes the data used. Section 3.4 outlines the model selection
procedures. Section 3.5 summarizes the regression results, and Section 3.6 concludes the
paper.
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3.2 Background on the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a joint effort program created
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help poor nations ac-
complish the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The HIPC Initiative was launched in
1996 and was later enhanced in 1999. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was
created in 2006 to supplement HIPC countries with more financial support.
HIPC Initiative calls for the voluntary debt relief by creditors. It could serve in a cred-
itor’s interest to forgive some debt to get these HIPC countries to a more sustainable debt
level so that the debtors will increase the chance of repayment on their loans. Creditors
can be commercial, bilateral, such as the Paris club, and multilateral creditors, such as the
World Bank.
The HIPC Initiative process mainly involves two stages: the Decision Point and the
Completion Point. The HIPC Initiative and MDRI provide aid and debt relief to countries
that are struggling to service their debt. However, to qualify for HIPC and MDRI (from here
on, HIPC will mean both HIPC and MDRI) Initiatives’ aid, countries must satisfy certain
criteria. Once they meet these conditions, then they receive irrevocable aid that arrives in a
lump sum payment. The large package of debt relief that ranges from hundreds of millions
to several billions of dollars. As of December 2011, the list of countries that have qualified
or potentially eligible for HIPC aid is listed in Table 3.1 and 3.2.
3.3 Data
This paper uses two datasets. The first data set has 63 countries (set A), 36 of which are
HIPCs, and 27 of which are the neighbors of HIPCs. The second dataset includes 56 countries
(set B), which contains all countries in the 63-countries except for the seven island countries.
Island countries do not have contiguous neighbors. However, a rational for including the
seven island countries is technology. Since island countries have bridges, ferries, cargo ships,
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and planes that enable them to perform business transactions with foreign countries, they
may have spatial relationships with other countries. The regressions performed on set A
should be viewed as a robustness check. The estimates of spatial parameters are statistically
significant in all models, which helps confirm the robustness of the results.
3.3.1 Dependent Variable
Both data set, A and B, cover the 1999-2010 time frame. The year 1999 is when the
HIPC Initiative was enhanced and when countries started their reform to enter the decision
point. The dependent variable is the change in log of the real GDP per capita [log(end
real GDP per capita) - log(initial real GDP per capita]. The real values use the base year of
2005. The average initial real GDP per capita is $2812.42 while the average ending real GDP
per capita is $4211.71. The source of this variable is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator data base.
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables are the amount of total (cumulative sum) HIPC debt relief per
capita, (HIPCrelief ), the dummy variable to indicate whether a country belongs to the
HIPC Initiative, (member), and the duration that a HIPC Initiative member has stayed
in the interim period so far, (months). Total HIPC debt relief per capita, (HIPCrelief ),
amounts are in millions of US dollars divided by the population in millions. Since 27 coun-
tries in the data set do not receive HIPC debt relief, HIPCrelief equals a zero for these
countries; hence, I cannot use the log of the variable. My anticipation is that this amount of
debt relief will not only impact the recipient country’s real GDP per capita but it will also
impact the surrounding neighbors’. Therefore, I include these 27 neighboring countries in
my analysis.
I also use the member variable to measure the impact of being a member of the HIPC
Initiative. This variable takes a ‘1’ if a country is a HIPC member, and a ‘0’ otherwise. I
aim to find the impact of being a HIPC member, regardless of the debt relief amount. The
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months variable also allows me to measure the effect of being a HIPC member, regardless of
the debt relief amount. This variable measures the time, in months, that country i spends
in the interim period. These two explanatory variables give us the non-monetary component
of the HIPC Initiative membership.
3.3.3 Control Variables
The additional control variables are the rule of law index, the polity score, the conflict
indicator, the inflation rate, the net official development aid (ODA) per capita amount,
net inflows of foreign direct investment, the public health expenditure ratio, the absolute
latitude, and the dummy variable indicating whether a country is landlocked. All of these
data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database. These variables are
averages from the year 1999 to year 2010. The starting year is 1999 because even though
HIPC Initiative was formed in 1996, but its first debt relief package was released in 1999.
The rule of law index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 being the relatively better rule.
This variable serves as a control for government quality. As mentioned in Burnside and
Dollar (2000), aid can be ineffective unless the recipient country has well established insti-
tutions. I also use the combined polity score from the Polity IV project that grades political
regimes.1 The combine polity score ranges from -10 to +10, strongly autocratic to strongly
democratic, respectively.
The conflict dummy variable serves as a proxy for a war ridden country. If country i has
battle related deaths in a year, the dummy variable takes ‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise. Numerous
African nations face dictator regimes or genocide or civil war that stripped them the ability
to progress. Therefore, the battle death counts for conflict effects.
The inflation rate is the average of the country’s annual inflation rate over the 1999-2010
period. The HIPC Initiative requires that recipient countries improve their macroeconomic
1The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011 by Marshall and
Jaggers: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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stability, and inflation serves as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. A country with un-
stable inflation rate would harm its citizens by bringing uncertainty into their day to day
business transactions, which, ultimately will decrease their income.
I also control for the net ODA amount because HIPC debt relief is not the only help
that a country can receive. Many countries receive ODA. This variable is in millions of U.S.
dollars. Besides the receipt of foreign aid, I also control for the expenditures in repaying
national debt. The variable debtservice captures the percentage of total debt service as a
percent of GNI.
Net foreign direct investment, FDI, is a tool to capture inflows of funds and capital from
other countries. It is a vehicle to promote productivity and economic growth. The health
expenditure variable is the ratio of public health expenditures divided to GDP. Theoretically
this ratio should improve the life expectancy and indirectly contribute to the GDP per
capita. For geographical characteristics controls, I use the absolute latitude and landlock
dummy. The absolute latitude of the country, absLat, takes a value between 0 and 1, with
1 being further away from the equator.2 The landlock variable controls for access to a port
that facilitates trade. Table 3.3 to Table 3.6 present the descriptive statistics of all of the
variables.
3.4 Econometric Models
My goal is to estimate the direct and indirect effects of HIPC membership on real GDP
per capita. According to Elhorst (2010), if the OLS model is rejected in favor of Spatial
AutoRegressive (SAR) or Spatial Error Model (SEM) then the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM)
should be estimated. If the theta (θ) parameter fails the hypothesis test of θ=0, then SAR
should be used. On the other hand, if θ + ρβ =0 then the SEM should be used. I ran the
Spatial Durbin regression and my models passed the test of having ρ an θ not equal to zero.
2Data from article: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.. and Vishny, R. 1999. The Quality of
Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1): 222-279.
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The SDM model takes the following form:
yi = αiN + ρΣWijyj +Xiβ + ΣWijXijθ + εi
εi ∼MVN(0, σ2In)
(3.1)
I find that the thetas, (θ), and the rhos, (ρ), are not zero; therefore, I will use the SDM
model. Nevertheless, I also estimate the SLX model as a robustness check.
yi = αiN +Xiβ + ΣWijXijθ + εi
εi ∼MVN(0, σ2In)
(3.2)
Here n is the number of observations, in this case, it is the number of countries. Y is an
n x 1 vector of observations which contains the dependent variable, real GDP per capita.
X is an n x k matrix of independent variables. ε is an n x 1 vector of independently and
identically distributed disturbance, and β is a k x 1 vector of regression parameters. The
W is an n x n, row normalized, four-nearest-neighbors spatial weight matrix. The spatial
weight matrix, W, is of geographic location which is exogeneous to real GDP per capita.
Using a nearest-neighbor spatial weight matrix instead of a contiguity spatial weight matrix
helps me deal with island countries. Some countries do not have any connected neighbor.
(θ) is a k x 1 vector of response parameter to the interaction effects of WX.
In terms of interpretations, the SLX model’s β’s represent the direct effect of X while θ’s
correspond to the indirect (or spillover) effects. Unlike the SLX, the SDM model is a little
more complicated because of the ρ term. The ρ is the spatial dependence parameter, and it
informs us the feedback effects. Equation 3.3 expresses the SDM model in reduced form.
yi = (I − ρW )−1αiN + (I − ρW )−1(Xβ +WXθ) + (I − ρW )−1εi (3.3)
When we compute ∂y/∂Xr we get (In − ρW )−1(βXi + WθXi). Therefore, β is no longer
sufficient to measure the impact of the X variable. To properly interpret the impact of each
explanatory variable, we need to look at each variable’s direct and indirect effects.
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3.5 Regression Results
The spatial autocorrelation parameters, ρ’s are statistically significant in all model vari-
ations. The ρ’s range from 0.5 to 0.75. This translates to similar GDP per capita from
country i and its surrounding neighbors. Even when island countries are included, there
are significant spillovers effects of the HIPC member variable. Direct effects measure how a
change in the explanatory variable in location i can affect the dependent variable at location
i, plus the feedback effects. Indirect effects (θ’s) are cumulated over all neighbors of location
i to other locations.
For the SDM model, we cannot simply look at the β’s and θ’s because of feedback effects
from the ρ’s. Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 list the direct, indirect, and total effects for the
SDM models for the 64 countries data set and the 57 countries data set, respectively. Direct
effects are statistically significant for HIPC debt relief, and the months. Indirect effects are
statistically significant for the HIPC member variable. For the SLX model, direct effects are
the β’s and indirect effects are the θ’s.
Out of the three HIPC variables, two of them, HIPCrelief and the HIPC program dura-
tion, months, have statistically significant direct, and total effects. HIPCrelief direct effect is
-0.00013, indirect effect is 4e-06, and the total effect is -0.00012. The OLS coefficient for this
model specification is -0.00014. Using HIPC debt relief, OLS and SDM results are similar.
When we use the dummy member variable, results are different. Without the spatial
model, we will only see that member has no statistical significance from OLS. However, with
the Spatial Durbin Model, the indirect effect is statistically significant at -0.15324. This
represents the spatial spillover effects of being a HIPC member on neighboring countries.
The impact is negative. Hence, having a neighbor that is a HIPC country adversely affects
one’s GDP.
There are several requirements for HIPC countries to complete before they finish the pro-
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gram. Besides maintaining macroeconomic stability, they also need to increase public health
expenditures, build more schools, and decrease poverty. These attempts should help increase
real GDP per capita. Economic reasons behind the negative effects of HIPC variables could
be due to the fact that we use averaged data from 1999 to 2010 for all counties. This includes
countries that completed the program long before 2010. Therefore, while some countries saw
an increase in real GDP per capita, others may have regressed after they exited the program.
Another surprising result is the statistical insignificance of the variable conflict. Accord-
ing to Murdoch and Sandler (2002), when there is civil war in one country, its neighbors are
affected too. My results for conflict has no spillover effects. I infer this difference in outcome
due to our difference in time frames and in econometrics approaches. Their study spans from
1961 to 1990, while mine is from 1999 to 2010. We have no overlap. Also, they test their
spillover effects using neighbors that are contiguous, while I use a nearest-neighbor spatial
weight matrix. Therefore, in my study, being in a conflict does not have the strong impact
that Murdoch and Sandler find in their paper.
Overall, there is consistency in the SLX and the SDM models with regards to impacts of
belonging to the HIPC Initiative. HIPCrelief, the relief per capita amount, has a negative
effect on the recipient country, with no spillover. Being a HIPC member does not have a
statistically significant direct effect on the member country, but it has a negative spillover
effect onto surrounding countries. And, the length of time that a country stays in the HIPC
program negatively affects its real GDP per capita, but months have no spillover effects.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper uses the Spatial Durbin Model to investigate spatial correlations in countries’
GDP per capita growth and spillover effects of explanatory variables. I document two key
results from the effect of HIPC Initiative debt relief. First, the dependent variable, change in
real GDP per capita, is spatially correlated, with ρ values ranging from 0.46 to 0.75. Second,
there are negative spatial spillovers effect of HIPC’s membership from country i, onto its
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neighbor, country j, based on the indirect effect of the explanatory variable, member.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Country List 1
Name Months HIPC dummy HIPC aid (millions)
1 Afghanistan 31 1 $ 1,319
2 Algeria 0 0 $ -
3 Andorra 0 0 $ -
4 Argentina 0 0 $ -
5 Benin 32 1 $ 1,596
6 Bolivia 16 1 $ 4,876
7 Brazil 0 0 $ -
8 Burkina Faso 21 1 $ 2,147
9 Burundi 41 1 $ 1,468
10 Cameroon 66 1 $ 6,202
11 Cape Verde 0 0 $ -
12 Central African Republic 21 1 $ 1,105
13 Chad 117 1 $ 260
14 Chile 0 0 $ -
15 Comoros 7 1 $ 136
16 Congo, Dem Rep 84 1 $ 16,273
17 Congo, Republic of 46 1 $ 1,942
18 Costa Rica 0 0 $ -
19 Cote d’Ivoire 40 1 $ 3,415
20 Dominican Republic 0 0 $ -
21 Egypt 0 0 $ -
22 El Salvador 0 0 $ -
23 Eritrea 0 0 $ -
24 Ethiopia 29 1 $ 6,555
25 Gabon 0 0 $ -
26 Gambia 84 1 $ 495
27 Ghana 29 1 $ 7,368
28 Guatemala 0 0 $ -
29 Guinea 143 1 $ 800
30 Guinea-Bissau 122 1 $ 790
31 Guyana 37 1 $ 2,061
32 Haiti 31 1 $ 1,172
33 Honduras 58 1 $ 3,714
34 Kenya 0 0 $ -
35 Liberia 27 1 $ 4,866
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Table 3.2: Country List 2
Name Months HIPC dummy HIPC aid (millions)
36 Libya 0 0 $ -
37 Madagascar 47 1 $ 4,293
38 Malawi 69 1 $ 3,205
39 Mali 30 1 $ 2,887
40 Mauritania 28 1 $ 1,983
41 Mauritius 0 0 $ -
42 Mozambique 17 1 $ 6,332
43 Namibia 0 0 $ -
44 Nicaragua 38 1 $ 6,404
45 Niger 41 1 $ 2,252
46 Nigeria 0 0 $ -
47 Pakistan 0 0 $ -
48 Paraguay 0 0 $ -
49 Peru 0 0 $ -
50 Rwanda 53 1 $ 1,827
51 Sao Tome and Principe 76 1 $ 333
52 Senegal 47 1 $ 3,320
53 Sierra Leone 58 1 $ 1,659
54 South Africa 0 0 $ -
55 Sudan 0 0 $ -
56 Suriname 0 0 $ -
57 Tajikistan 0 0 $ -
58 Tanzania 19 1 $ 6,810
59 Togo 25 1 $ 360
60 Turkmanistan 0 0 $ -
61 Uganda 3 1 $ 5,443
62 Venezuela 0 0 $ -
63 Zambia 53 1 $ 6,647
64 Zimbabwe 0 0 $ -
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics - 63 countries
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
HIPCrelief 63 257.551 488.434 0.000 86.894 2,672.256
member 63 0.556 0.501 0 1 1
months 63 26.857 33.475 0 19 143
FDI 63 4.014 4.119 −5.739 2.845 22.140
inflation 63 10.932 12.657 1.426 8.481 98.294
oda 63 608.341 660.418 22.967 379.579 3,096.562
ROL 63 −0.730 0.615 −1.828 −0.738 1.269
polity 63 −1.693 14.685 −65.273 1.000 10.000
conflict 63 0.413 0.496 0 0 1
Health 63 2.553 1.131 0.004 2.435 5.869
debtservice 63 3.785 3.391 0.090 3.062 23.175
landlock 63 0.286 0.455 0 0 1
iRGDPpc 63 2,812.417 3,079.963 211.944 1,311.017 11,747.240
nRGDPpc 63 4,211.711 4,404.282 342.704 1,951.369 16,632.850
absLat 63 0.161 0.107 0.000 0.150 0.444
lat 63 4.456 17.280 −38.416 7.947 38.970
long 63 −3.621 45.448 −90.231 6.613 71.276
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics - 56 countries
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
HIPCrelief 56 242.003 449.765 0.000 74.755 2,672.256
member 56 0.554 0.502 0 1 1
months 56 27.339 34.129 0 20 143
FDI 56 3.874 4.024 −5.739 2.790 22.140
inflation 56 11.210 13.306 2.100 8.351 98.294
oda 56 652.912 680.928 22.967 382.643 3,096.562
ROL 56 −0.770 0.577 −1.828 −0.765 1.269
polity 56 −2.216 15.057 −65.273 0.409 10.000
conflict 56 0.446 0.502 0 0 1
Health 56 2.563 1.164 0.004 2.436 5.869
debtservice 56 3.935 3.554 0.090 3.131 23.175
landlock 56 0.321 0.471 0 0 1
iRGDPpc 56 2,805.027 3,109.481 211.944 1,316.978 11,747.240
nRGDPpc 56 4,194.789 4,413.557 342.704 1,972.438 16,632.850
absLat 56 0.161 0.110 0.000 0.148 0.444
lat 56 4.961 17.326 −38.416 8.204 38.970
long 56 −3.868 44.690 −90.231 5.199 71.276
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ROL 0.038 0.058 0.063
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
polity 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(iRGDPpc) −0.016 −0.030 −0.008
(0.032) (0.038) (0.035)
inflation 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(oda) 0.044∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.044∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
FDI 0.025∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
debtservice 0.005 0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Health 0.030 0.018 0.007
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
conflict 0.054 0.057 0.071
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
absLat 0.009 0.040 0.082
(0.229) (0.235) (0.237)
landlock 0.122∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059)
Constant 0.102 0.280 0.105
(0.315) (0.365) (0.350)
Observations 63 63 63
R2 0.465 0.437 0.416
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.301 0.276
Residual Std. Error 0.166 0.170 0.173
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Change in log(real GDP pc)
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ROL 0.011 0.046 0.046
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
polity 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(iRGDPpc) −0.027 −0.028 −0.015
(0.035) (0.041) (0.038)
inflation 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(oda) 0.055∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.050∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
FDI 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
debtservice 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Health 0.038 0.020 0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
conflict 0.062 0.069 0.079
(0.056) (0.059) (0.058)
absLat 0.126 0.147 0.181
(0.233) (0.248) (0.247)
landlock 0.088 0.114∗ 0.115∗
(0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Constant 0.084 0.198 0.094
(0.351) (0.417) (0.408)
Observations 56 56 56
R2 0.481 0.429 0.420
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.270 0.258
Residual Std. Error 0.165 0.173 0.174
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Change in log(real GDP pc)
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ROL −0.002 0.014 0.003
(0.052) (0.051) (0.049)
polity 0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(iRGDPpc) −0.004 −0.017 −0.036
(0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
inflation −0.0002 −0.0005 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(oda) 0.002 −0.018 −0.027
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
FDI 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
debtservice 0.0004 −0.004 −0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Health 0.063∗∗ 0.042 0.051∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026)
conflict 0.036 0.051 0.049
(0.055) (0.055) (0.052)
absLat −0.600 −0.198 −0.167
(0.485) (0.465) (0.448)








WX.ROL −0.188 −0.102 −0.244∗
(0.139) (0.138) (0.128)
WX.polity −0.003 −0.006 −0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
WX.log(iRGDPpc) −0.083 −0.195∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.076) (0.074)
WX.inflation −0.010∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
WX.log(oda) −0.165∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.071) (0.069)
WX.FDI −0.013 −0.005 −0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
WX.debtservice −0.005 −0.009 0.011
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
WX.Health −0.005 −0.012 0.017
(0.052) (0.051) (0.047)
WX.conflict −0.019 −0.182 0.017
(0.143) (0.144) (0.134)
WX.absLat 0.517 −0.380 −0.218
(0.701) (0.735) (0.670)
WX.landlock 0.171 0.161 0.082
(0.146) (0.140) (0.148)
Constant 1.816∗∗ 3.721∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗
(0.834) (1.098) (1.007)
Observations 63 63 63
R2 0.648 0.660 0.686
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.445 0.487
Residual Std. Error 0.154 0.152 0.146
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Change in log(real GDP pc)
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ROL −0.048 −0.003 −0.016
(0.066) (0.068) (0.067)
polity 0.002 −0.0001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log(iRGDPpc) −0.014 0.001 −0.030
(0.046) (0.051) (0.049)
inflation 0.0004 0.0003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(oda) 0.028 −0.010 −0.026
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
FDI 0.012 0.008 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
debtservice 0.006 0.002 −0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Health 0.063∗ 0.030 0.044
(0.035) (0.038) (0.032)
conflict 0.040 0.043 0.027
(0.062) (0.066) (0.060)
absLat −0.331 −0.180 −0.319
(0.654) (0.669) (0.642)








WX.ROL −0.240 −0.179 −0.289
(0.186) (0.194) (0.176)
WX.polity 0.003 −0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
WX.log(iRGDPpc) −0.097 −0.194∗ −0.233∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.110)
WX.inflation −0.004 −0.009 −0.010∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
WX.log(oda) −0.099 −0.197∗ −0.230∗∗
(0.100) (0.100) (0.106)
WX.FDI −0.034 −0.013 −0.006
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026)
WX.debtservice 0.018 −0.008 0.007
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
WX.Health −0.015 −0.044 −0.025
(0.061) (0.064) (0.055)
WX.conflict −0.023 −0.290 −0.124
(0.207) (0.207) (0.165)
WX.absLat 0.440 −0.320 0.007
(0.937) (0.992) (0.901)
WX.landlock 0.119 0.206 0.120
(0.163) (0.158) (0.164)
Constant 1.325 3.319∗ 3.799∗∗
(1.365) (1.672) (1.774)
Observations 56 56 56
R2 0.635 0.617 0.648
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.320 0.376
Residual Std. Error 0.163 0.167 0.160
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Change in log(real GDP pc)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Can Foreign Aid Motivate
Institutional Reform?
An Evaluation of the HIPC Initiative
4.1 Introduction
In the 1970s Peter Bauer (1972) was a rarity among economists in questioning the de-
sirability and effectiveness of foreign aid programs. Mainstream development experts dis-
counted his perspectives. Condescendingly, Walt Rostow (1990, p. 386) alleged “a gap be-
tween the market economist and the wider but somewhat casual commentator on the human
condition”; and that “Bauer seemed most comfortable as a neoclassical gadfly on the rump
of what he regarded as the international liberal establishment.” More than two decades later,
Boone (1996) empirically vindicated Bauer’s views. He demonstrated that cross-country data
did not evidence a positive relationship between aid and economic growth in poor economies.
Bauer’s views suddenly became respectable among mainstream economists.
Of course, respectable did not equate to uncontroversial. Proponents of foreign aid did
not throw in the towel. Notably, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) were able to report a
positive aid-growth relationship based on cross-country data when the relationship was esti-
mated conditional on recipients having good policy environments (e.g., low rates of inflation;
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liberal trade policies). However, Easterly (2003) and Easterly et al. (2004) demonstrated
that those results were not robust to small changes in the time period and the countries
included in the sample. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) also failed to report that a positive
aid-growth effect even for recipients with good policy environments. Brumm (2003) went
further and argued that if long-run averages rather than panel data are employed, then both
the Burnside and Dollar and Easterly et al. samples indicate a significantly negative effect
of aid on growth; regardless of the policy environment.1
A number of political economy concerns are associated with the provision of foreign aid
to developing economies. These concerns suggest that foreign aid is likely to have deleterious
effects on recipients’ institutional quality. North and Thomas (1973) and North (1990) were
seminal in focusing researchers’ attentions on the role of institutional quality in economic
development. They emphasized the importance of the ”rules of the game” and how they
shape human action, channeling it towards relatively productive or unproductive endeavors.
Studies by Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1996), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et
al. (2001, 2002), Rodrick et al. (2004), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) subsequently
reported evidence of a robust, positive relationship between the strength of property rights
and the rule-of-law on the one hand and income levels and growth on the other. A large
empirical literature now supports the consensus view that institutions rule (Rodrick et al.,
2004).
If aid is, at best, effective in promoting economic growth in good policy environments,
then the potential for aid flows to cause deteriorations in institutional quality is doubly trou-
bling. Aid may tend to degrade the very institutional arrangements that are necessary for
it to be potentially helpful. Moreover, the cold hard fact is that countries tend to be poor
because they have poor institutional quality in the first place. This suggests that to be ef-
fective aid must be conditional on improvements in the policies and institutions of recipients.
1Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) survey studies of unconditional and conditional effectiveness.
Their meta-analyses do not evidence aid’s effectiveness, nor of the conditionality of its effectiveness on
policy.
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In this paper we review the political economy concerns associated with foreign aid and
the existing evidence suggesting that they are important. These concerns suggest that aid
is likely to have harmful effects on recipients’ institutions; likewise, that attempts to give
aid conditional on reforms are unlikely to succeed. Then we turn our attention to a re-
cent multilateral aid program that is explicitly designed to foster improvements in policies
and institutional quality and to monitor the progress of those improvements. Established
in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative aims to help low-income
countries (LICs) burdened with large amounts of debt achieve robust economic growth and
development. The HIPC Initiative represents the IMF’s and World Bank’s best attempt
to acknowledge and overcome the political economy concerns associated with foreign aid.
To date is has provided over $76 billion in debt relief conditional (at least nominally) on
recipient reforms.
We present evidence that the HIPC Initiative’s track record has been lackluster. Ex-
amining measures of economic and political institutional quality, about one third of coun-
tries experienced decreases while participating in the Initiative. For participating countries
that experienced increases in these measures, in almost every single case the increases were
negligible. Furthermore, we present the results of regressions that relate changes in the
institutional measures to HIPC Initiative aid. The partial correlations between aid and in-
stitutional change are never statistically significant. When the point estimates are positive
they suggest miniscule effects. The best shot by the IMF and World Bank to link foreign
aid to policy and institutional reforms has failed to overcome the perverse incentives that
aid creates.
4.2 Foreign Aid and Institutional Quality
The ostensible motivation for developed economies and international agencies to give
foreign aid is twofold. First and foremost, donors desire that poor economies do not remain
poor. Being poor is characterized by a lack of income and wealth; rich economies can fill
Schlosky and Young Chapter 4. Can Foreign Aid Motivate Institutional Reform? 59
the gap by transferring some of their income and wealth to the poor. Second, poor countries
must use the aid to not only raise current consumption levels, but to undertake investments
that lead to sustained growth. Who better to advise about and orchestrate those invest-
ments than the experts from demonstrated economic development successes, i.e., the rich
economies?
Of course, the reality of foreign aid is anything but straightforward. Foreign aid is not
delivered via a helicopter drop. Rather, it is typically delivered through a recipient govern-
ment. Recipient politicians respond to incentives associated with acquiring the aid. Then
the recipient government must disburse the aid. Recipient politicians respond to incentives
associated with disbursing the aid in particular ways; other individuals in the recipient econ-
omy respond to incentives associated with becoming the particular ways in which the aid
is disbursed. There is a complex political economy of aid where the ultimate patterns of
disbursement are a function of the institutions within in which recipient agents operate.
Generally, then, foreign aid can create incentives for those agents to emphasize certain in-
stitutions that allow them to benefit from the aid, and to change or ignore (and therefore
weaken) those institutions that hinder their efforts to benefit.
Sadly, the heyday of foreign aid programs was characterized by an ignorance of these
political economy concerns. As Leeson (2008, p. 40) noted:
In the years preceding WWII, economic development as a field of
economic study did not exist in ant meaningful sense. [...] On the
contrary, from the classical political economists, such as Smith (1776)
and J. S. Mill (1848), to their intellectual successors, such as Ludwig
von Mises (1949) and F. A. Hayek (1960), the causes and consequences
of the wealth and poverty of nations were simply part of the unified
social science of political economy.
But this subsequently changed. Aside from a handful of luminaries such as Peter Bauer,
economists and policymakers began to lose sight of the political economy of foreign aid. The
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rise of the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, and the so-called “development community”
was associated with the proliferation of technocratic development experts. These experts
believed that a centrally planned “national economic development policy” embodying “an
overall integrated national plan” was a sine qua non for achieving sustained economic growth
(Bauer, 1969).2 They turned a blind eye to the fact that the potential for aid to help (or
harm) depended on the incentives faced by agents in both donor and recipient countries, as
well as their ability to overcome the information problems associated with the allocation and
utilization of the aid (Williamson, 2010).
Within the political economy of foreign aid there are a number of specific mechanisms
through which aid can be linked to deteriorations in institutional quality. For example, if
we conceive of a government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan,
1980) then opportunities for foreign aid can make it less responsive and accountable to its
citizens. For a given level of spending, foreign aid leaves a recipient government less reliant
on tax revenues. If politicians believe that they can turn to foreign aid when its citizens
become less willing to pay taxes, then they will act with less concern for their reactions.
Alternatively, citizens will support what are ultimately ill-advised government expenditures
when, in the short-run, they are not financed by their tax dollars. Foreign aid can soften a
recipient government’s budget constraint and also make it more independent of its citizens’
preferences and budget constraints.
Aid flows also represent windfalls that politicians can choose to disburse through specific
channels and towards specific individuals or firms. Aid creates means by which politicians
can secure their power and/or extract bribes or favors. Furthermore, individuals and firms
may perceive the rewards to joining the competition for aid disbursements to be greater than
those associated with productive activities (Baumol, 1990). Djankov et al. (2008) has drawn
an analogy between aid flows and the sort of subterranean resources associated with resource
curses (Auty, 1990; Sachs and Warner, 1999 & 2001). Both represent ”point-source” flows
of rents around which well-defined competition can emerge. The wasteful competition can
2Bauer pulls the specific “national economic development policy” from Myrdal (1956, p. 63).
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corrupt a recipient economy’s institutions. Svensson (2000) analyzed this sort of competition
in a game theoretic framework. He modeled aid as a common-pool resource that can either
be allocated by the government towards public goods provision or appropriated by private
agents for consumption. Svensson’s analysis highlights the twofold costs associated with the
competition for aid disbursements. First, efforts by private agents to appropriate aid are
redundant and therefore wasteful. Second, the efforts to appropriate aid are undertaken at
the cost of productive activities.
A growing literature has provided empirical evidence demonstrating the links between
foreign aid flows and decreases in institutional quality. Svenson (2000) reported that aid
flows are associated with higher levels of corruption in government. Rajan and Sabramanian
(2007) found that aid flows are correlated with reductions in countries’ International country
Risk Guide scores; Brutigam and Knack (2004) reported similar results for a sample of
Sub-Saharan African countries. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) found that aid discouraged
recipients from undertaking democratic reforms and Djankov et al. (2008) reported that
higher aid flows were associated with actual deteriorations in recipients’ political institutions.
Powell and Ryan (2006) and Heckelman and Knack (2008) found similar effects on economic
institutions. More recently, Young and Sheehan (2014) reported that aid has negative effects
on a number of political and economic institutional quality measures based on a panel of
116 countries during 1970-2010. Regarding economic institutions, Young and Sheehan found
that a recipient’s legal system, the security of its property rights, and its openness to trade
are particularly affected.
4.3 The HIPC Initiative
Established in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) Initiative aims to help low-income countries (LICs) burdened with high debt to
achieve robust economic growth and development. The HIPC Initiative calls for the volun-
tary provision of debt relief by a participating country’s creditors. These creditors can be
other countries, international organizations, or commercial interests. In 2005 the Multilat-
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eral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) supplemented the HIPC Initiative. The MDRI provides,
for countries successfully completing the HIPC Initiative, full relief on debts to the IMF,
World Bank, and the African Development Fund. To date, 36 countries have participated in
the HIPC Initiative and, collectively, their debt service has declined by about 1.8 percentage
points of GDP.3
Built into the HIPC Initiative is an expectation that participants pursue policy and in-
stitutional reforms that decrease the risk of relapses into high debt levels and increase the
likelihood of sustained growth. Participating countries are required to produce a Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to be approved by the IMF and World Bank. Progress
reports must be submitted and the PRSP must be satisfactorily implemented for at least
one year. Upon approval (“decision point”) countries receive interim debt relief in advance
of the “completion point” when irrevocable debt stock relief is granted. As of May 2015, of
39 countries eligible for the Initiative, 36 had participated in the Initiative and reached the
completion point.4 By the last estimate (net present value as of 2013) about $76 billion of
debt relief had been granted (IDA & IMF, 2013).
Debt relief is, of course, a very particular type of foreign aid. Cassimon and van Camp-
enhout (2007) have argued that debt relief is a type of multilateral aid that is relatively ef-
fective. Regardless of the veracity of that claim, in this paper we are interested in the HIPC
Initiative in because of the conditions that are imposed on Initiative participants.5 Those
conditions represent “a heavy and diversified portfolio of conditionality, including not only
broad macroeconomic and structural reform [...] through the conventional IMF program, but
3See: https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last accessed May 15, 2015).
4See: https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last accessed May 15,
2015). Chad reached the completion point most recently as of May 13, 2015:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15124.pdf (last accessed May 15, 2015).
5Cassimon and van Campenhout (2007) employ a very non-standard approach relative to most of the
empirical foreign aid literature. They study a panel of annual data from on 28 HIPC countries, 1991-2004,
in a vector autoregression (VAR) with 7 variables. Aside from debt relief, the remaining 6 variables are all
government expenditure, revenue, and borrowing variables. Aside from country fixed effects, there are no
other control variables. There is no explicit link from the expenditure, revenue, and borrowing variables to
other economic outcomes (e.g., income growth). Therefore, as an aside, there is good reason to question the
veracity of their claim.
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also with broad poverty focus through the PRSP” (Cassimon and van Campenhout, 2007, p.
747). Participating countries are determined to have reached their completion points when
they “maintain macroeconomic stability under a PRGF-[Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility]-supported program, carry out key structural and social reforms, and implement a
PRSP for one year[.]”6
Consider Togo as an example. Togo reached the decision point and began participation
in the HIPC Initiative in November of 2008. At that time Togo had an external debt greater
than 60% of its GDP.7 Togo reached the completion point in December of 2010. During the
interim period, Togo’s “triggers” for reaching the completion point were:
1. preparation of a full [PRSP] and its satisfactory implementation for at least one year,
as evidenced by a PRSP Annual Progress Report [...];
2. maintenance of macroeconomic stability [...];
3. adopt a mechanism to track public expenditures for poverty reduction on the basis of
a function expenditure classification [...];
4. appoint judges for the Court of Accounts and give them work space, equipment, and
materials; and submit the draft of the Budget Execution Law and draft General Trea-
sury Balance [...] to the Court of Accounts and Parliament for at least one fiscal
year;
5. adopt a decree creating the Procurement Regulatory Authority in conformity with the
[West African Economic and Monetary Union] Procurement Directives; nominate its
managerial staff, and give them an adequate budget [...];
6. implement regular public reporting of payments to, and revenues received by, the
government for the phosphates sector in line with this aspect of the [Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative] criteria [...];
6FAQ section: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:
20259564 pagePK:64166689 piPK:64166646 theSitePK:469043,00.html#07 (last accessed May 14, 2015).
7http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1128.pdf; p. 38: last accessed May 25, 2015.
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7. consolidate external and domestic debt data under a single unit charged with all public
debt management tasks;
8. publish an annual report on a government website giving accurate and complete data
on external and domestic public debt [...].
These triggers all relate, directly or indirectly, the transparency and quality of governance.
Triggers 2 through 8 have elements that are clearly meant to address institutions that relate
to a country’s accumulation and management of debt. Alternatively, Togo’s PRSP was a
”comprehensive strategy” based on “four strategic pillars” including the ”strengthening of
governance” and the “consolidation of the bases for strong and sustained governance”.8 More
explicitly, Togo’s PRSP referred to the “improvement of political and economic governance”;
in particular, ”political reforms, strengthening of the rule of law and of the security of per-
sons and property, and implementation of institutional reforms” and ”greater transparency
in the management of public finance [and] anti-corruption measures”.9
Undoubtedly, the HIPC Initiative is one of the most comprehensive attempts to provide
foreign aid conditional on structural adjustments of the recipient. The Initiative explicitly
insists on a participant articulating and pursuing a “national economic development policy”
and ”an overall integrated national plan” in the form of a PRSP. Has the HIPC Initiative
been effective at fostering improvements in institutional quality? Ostensibly, the IMF and
World Bank have been taking the conditionality of structural adjustments seriously. Table
4.1 lists the participating countries along with the dates associated with their decision and
completion dates; also the number of months spent in the interim period. If the results of
participation were simply “rubber-stamped”, one might expect fairly uniform participation
durations. Quite to the contrary, time spent in the interim period ranged from 3 months
(Uganda) to 170 months (Chad), with an average of about 49 months and a comparable
standard deviation of about 35 and half months.
8See IMF Country Report No. 11/28: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1128.pdf (last
accessed May 15, 2015). The triggers are quoted verbatim (with ”[...]”s noted).
9See ”Togo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2009-11)” (p. 8):
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1128.pdf (last accessed May 15, 2015).
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However, the institutional problems that HIPCs face may be more fundamental than any
relatively short-term aid/debt relief program can hope to correct. Easterly (2002) points out
that the HIPC Initiative countries during 1980-1997 had, on average, worse policies than
other low-income countries despite two decades of debt relief efforts prior to the HIPC
Initiative. Is this latest program proving more successful?
4.4 The Record thus Far
How have HIPCI Initiative participants fared in terms of increasing the quality of their
policies and institutions? We use the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World
(EFW) index as a measure of economic institutions (Gwartney et al., 2014) and the Free-
dom House political rights (PR) index as a measure of political institutions.
The EFW index provides a comprehensive gauge of how well defined property rights are,
how free individuals are to make use of their property, and the extent to which individuals
are protected from expropriation of their property.10 Each country is scoped on a scale of
0 to 10 with 10 representing most economically free. From 2000-2012 the average country
has an EFW value of 6.74 and the standard deviation across countries is just about 1. The
PR index measures how freely individuals are allowed to participate in the political process;
whether they can vote freely in legitimate elections, join political organizations and parties,
and competitively seek public offices.11 Each country is scored on a scale of 1 to 7 and its
2000-2012 average and standard deviation are, respectively, 3.37 and 2.16.
10We use the chain-linked index. The EFW index has been shown to correlate positively with economic
growth rates in cross-country samples. For example, see Ayal and Karras (1998), Gwartney et al. (1999),
Heckelman and Stroup (2000), and Young and Sheehan (2014). The EFW index has also been shown to
correlate positively with political freedom (Lawson and Clark, 2010), health outcomes (Stroup, 2007), labor
shares (Young and Lawson, 2014), the extent to which individuals trust one another (Berggren and Jordahl,
2006), and self-reported happiness (Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Gehring, 2003; Nikolaev, 2014). For a
comprehensive review of the literature see Hall and Lawson (2013).
11The methodology of the PR index can be found at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2012/methodology#.VWOGRVuA0n0; the PR index data is available at https://freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-world#.VWOHz1uA0n0 (both last accessed on May 25, 2015).
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Table 4.2 reports (subject to data availability) changes in the EFW and PR indices for
HIPC Initiative participants. Changes are reported for, first, the interval from decision point
to completion point and, second, the interval from completion point to 5 years later. Changes
are reported for individual participants and then, as well, the average changes across par-
ticipants are reported. Most striking is the number of countries that actually experienced
decreases in these institutional measures while participating in the HIPC Initiative. For
countries with EFW scores available for both the decision and completion point dates, just
about one third (8 out of 25) experienced decreases in measured economic freedom. The
record is almost equally dreary for political rights: over 28% of participants (10 out of 35)
experienced decreases in their PR scores while participating in the Initiative.
Averaging over HIPC Initiative participants, the mean EFW change was a mere 0.22.
Granted, that is positive; but recall that the standard deviation across countries was just
about a full point (0.99 to be exact). Furthermore, 0.22 is less than the 2012 difference
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (4.77) and the Republic of the Congo (4.77).
From a different perspective, the 2012 difference between the UK (7.92) and France (7.27)
is about three times 0.22. These are miniscule improvements (if one can call them such)
on average. On the political rights front the average HIPC change in the PR index from
decision to completion was actually negative (-0.20).
By the design, the HIPC Initiative insists that participants articulate and then have ap-
proved a plan for structural adjustment of their policies and institutions (i.e., the PRSP).
Consider the case of Cameroon, which entered the HIPC Initiative in October of 2000 and
reached completion over 5 years later in April 2006. From decision point to completion point
Cameroon experienced decreases in both its EFW score (-0.04) and its PR score (-1.00).
However, in 2006 the IMF and World Bank “agreed that Cameroon [had] made sufficient
progress and taken the necessary steps to reach its completion point”:
Schlosky and Young Chapter 4. Can Foreign Aid Motivate Institutional Reform? 67
To reach the completion point, Cameroon met a number of trig-
gers involving macroeconomic stability, commitment to a poverty
reduction strategy, investment in social services as well as progress
in privatization and reform of the forestry and transport sectors. In
addition, Cameroon took steps to improve governance and fight official
corruption.12
Shortly after most of its debt was forgiven, the Cameroon parliament amended the con-
stitution so that Paul Biya could run for a third term as president. President Biya originally
came to power in a single-party system in 1982. He was elected to a new seven-year term in
2011 with an implausible 78% of the vote in an election replete with irregularities. In 2007,
following completion of the HIPC Initiative and the subsequent debt relief, Cameroon’s pub-
lic debt was 12% of its GDP (down from 51.8% in 2005). However, by 2014 it had increased
to 19.5% and an IMF report estimated that it would continue to rise to about 30% during
2015-2019 and then over 50% during 2020-2034.13 This apparently corresponds to results of
reforms deemed “sufficient progress” by the World Bank and IMF.
Generally, one may argue that short-run participation in the HIPC Initiative merely laid
the foundations for subsequent, meaningful reforms. However, participants did not generally
experience large gains in EFW and PR scores during the 5 years subsequent to completion
of the Initiative. The average EFW score increase was only 0.33 for countries for which
we have the data. (The average increase was only 0.26 if the Rwanda outlier is excluded.)
The average PR score increase was a bit better (0.44) but 24% (6 out of 25) of countries
experienced actual decreases in their measured political rights in the 5 years subsequent to
participation.
Of course, the changes reported in table 4.2 are entirely unconditional. In table 4.3 we
report some results based on regressing changes in institutional quality scores on HIPC Ini-
tiative aid disbursements. For each institutional measure (EFW or PR) we first consider
13https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2012/dsacr12237.pdf; table 1, p. 2: last accessed May
26, 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14212.pdf; table 7, p. 6: last accessed May 26,
2015.
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regressions including (a) the total amount of debt relief disbursed and then (b) that total
separated into (a) the amount provided in the interim (decision to completion) period and
the remainder provided subsequent to completion.14 In each of the (a) and (b) regressions
we control for a participant’s initial (decision point) institutional score and the months spent
by the participant in the interim period. Then for each institutional measure we also report
a regression where (c) we additionally control for a country’s real per capita GDP growth
rate during the interim period, a dummy variable for the African continent, and the ethnic
fractionalization measure provided by Alesina et al. (2003). Even in the case of the (c)
regressions the control variable set is very limited. We only have between 25 and 35 obser-
vations per regression to work with and make no claims whatsoever in terms of identifying
”true” causal effects. Rather, the point of table 4.3 is simply to report the partial corre-
lations of aid with institutional change while taking into account some other basic covariates.
Total aid does not enter into either of the (a) regressions significantly. The point esti-
mates on total HICP Initiative aid are also very small. A 10% increase in a country’s total
aid is associated with about a 0.66 point increase in its PR score, and only about a 0.02
increase in its EFW score. Even if these estimated correlations were statistically different
than zero (which they are not) they suggest that the HIPC Initiative is not resulting in
meaningful reforms of policies and institutions on the part of its participants.
The story remains essentially the same looking at the (b) and (c) regressions. Splitting
the HIPC aid into interim and upon-completion components may make sense if HIPC Ini-
tiative if the interim period is the ”carrot” provide the incentives for reforms that ultimately
lead to the big debt relief upon completion. The coefficient point estimates are often con-
sistent with this. (Except for in the PR regression (b), interim aid enters positively while
the remainder enters negatively.) But all of the coefficient estimates are small; none are
14These disbursements are gathered from the HIPC Status of Implementation Reports for individual
countries. Aid disbursements are taken as decision point GDP shares and then logged before entering the
regressions. We lose handful of observations because GDP numbers are not available for Guyana, Haiti, and
Nicaragua. The primary result (i.e., aid variables to not enter significantly and with quantitatively small
point estimates) is unchanged if aid is not taken as a share of GDP. GDP data is from the Penn World Table
8.1 (Freenstra et al., 2015).
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statistically significant.
4.5 Conclusion
Overall, the record of the HIPC Initiative is troubling. The good news is that none of
the results reported above link the Initiative to decreases in institutional quality. But the
HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive, structured attempt by the IMF and World Bank to
provide foreign aid - specifically debt relief - conditional on participants making policy and
institutional reforms. What is troubling is the lack of any evidence that this conditionality
has been effective.
Also troubling is the fact that the IMF and World Bank signed off on participants’ com-
pletion points as if meaningful reforms had occurred. We highlight the case of Cameroon.
Cameroon experienced measured decreases in measured economic and political institutional
quality while participating in the HIPC Initiative. The IMF and World Bank stated that
Cameroon “had made significant progress and taken the necessary steps”; including “steps
to improve governance and fight corruption”. Almost a decade later, Cameroon has seen its
debt level rise again under the leadership of the same corrupt president that it has had since
1982.
The political economy concerns associated with foreign aid are compelling. Yet despite
mounting evidence that aid is not effective even in good policy and institutional environ-
ments, and that aid actually leads, all else equal, to decreases in the quality of policies and
institutions, calls for increased foreign aid persist. These include calls for more debt relief,
such as that provided by the HIPC Initiative. Unfortunately, the record of HIPC Initiative
not only serves to emphasize the importance of political economy concerns. Its record sug-
gests that even foreign aid programs designed in recognition of the political economy concerns
to address them are still unlikely to succeed.
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4.6 Tables
Table 4.1: HIPC Initiative Participants: Decision and Completion Dates
Country Decision Date Completion Date Interim (Months)
Afghanistan July 2007 January 2010 30
Benin July 2000 March 2003 32
Bolivia February 2000 June 2001 16
Burkina Faso July 2000 April 2002 21
Burundi August 2005 June 2009 41
Cameroon October 2000 July 2010 67
Central African Republic September 2007 June 2009 21
Chad May 2001 May 2015 170
Comoros June 2010 December 2012 30
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the July 2003 July 2010 84
Congo, Rep. of March 2006 January 2010 46
Cote d’Ivoire March 2009 June 2012 40
Ethiopia November 2001 April 2004 29
Gambia, The December 2000 December 2007 84
Ghana February 2002 July 2004 29
Guinea December 2000 September 2012 143
Guinea-Bissau December 2000 December 2010 120
Guyana November 2000 December 2003 37
Haiti November 2006 June 2009 31
Honduras June 2000 April 2005 58
Liberia March 2008 June 2010 27
Madagascar December 2000 October 2004 46
Malawi December 2000 August 2006 68
Mali September 2000 March 2003 30
Mauritania February 2000 June 2002 28
Mozambique April 2000 September 2001 17
Nicaragua December 2000 January 2004 37
Niger December 2000 April 2004 40
Rwanda December 2000 April 2005 52
Sao Tome and Principe December 2000 March 2007 75
Senegal June 2000 April 2004 46
Sierra Leone March 2002 December 2006 57
Tanzania April 2000 November 2001 19
Togo November 2008 December 2010 25
Uganda February 2000 May 2000 3
Zambia December 2000 April 2005 52
Source: various IMF HIPC Initiative reports.
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Table 4.2: HIPC Initiative Participants: Changes in Economic Freedom and Political Rights
Country Change in EFW Change in PR
(Decision to (Next (Decision to (Next
Completion) 5 Years) Completion) 5 Years)
Afghanistan -1
Benin 0.49 0.05 0 0
Bolivia -0.27 -0.27 0 2
Burkina Faso 0 1
Burundi 0.4 1 2
Cameroon -0.04 0.09 -1 0
Central African Republic 0.14 0 2
Chad
Comoros 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.4 0
Congo, Rep. of 0.16 1
Cote d’Ivoire -0.01 -1
Ethiopia 0 0
Gambia, The -3 2
Ghana 0.35 0.35 0 -1
Guinea -1
Guinea-Bissau 1.02 0
Guyana -0.45 0.17 0 0
Haiti 0.24 0
Honduras 0.39 0.19 0 1
Liberia 0
Madagascar 0.91 0.4 1 3
Malawi 0.57 0.68 1 -1
Mali -0.1 -0.06 0 0
Mauritania -1 -1
Mozambique 0 0
Nicaragua 0.21 0.22 0 1
Niger -0.17 0.49 -1 2
Rwanda 0.52 1.54 -1 0
Sao Tome and Principe 1 0
Senegal -0.07 0.37 -1 1
Sierra Leone 0.46 0.63 0 -1
Tanzania 0.07 0.33 0 0
Togo 0.34 0
Uganda 0 0.04 0 -1
Zambia -0.04 0.34 -1 -1
HIPC Avg. Change 0.22 0.33 -0.2 0.44
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Table 4.3: Relationship between Aid and Changes in Economic Freedom during Participation
in HIPC Initiative
Change in EFW Change in PR
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
(log) Total Aid 0.0024 0.0656
(0.0090) (0.1178)
(log) Interim Aid 0.0249 0.0185 0.0308 0.0219
(0.1046) (0.1230) (0.2103) (0.3129)
(log) (Total Net of Interim) -0.0237 -0.0353 0.0293 -0.0139
(0.0610) (0.0651) (0.1658) (0.2220)
Initial EFW or PR -0.2133** -0.2197** -0.2152 -0.2696*** -0.2726*** -0.2990***
(0.0938) (0.1012) (0.1267) (0.0811) (0.0920) (0.1035)
Months to Completion 0.0041 0.0045 0.0047 -0.002 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0066)




Ethnic Fractionalization -0.2445 -0.0343
(0.2835) (0.9249)
R2 0.4899 0.4933 0.5248 0.3691 0.3697 0.3521
Observations 22 22 22 31 31 29
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Constants are included in all regressions (though not reported).
EFW is the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index;




This dissertation is an attempt to study the effectiveness of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). For the first
essay, I employ a survival time model to perform a duration analysis on the time it takes
a member country to go from the Decision Point to the Completion Point. In the second
essay, I use the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) to check for spillover effects. And the final
essay examines the change in institutional quality of HIPC member countries from the time
they join the program to the time that they complete it.
Results from the first essay show no evidence of moral hazard. Using the Cox propor-
tional hazard model, I find that interim aid does not help in shortening the length of time
that countries take to go from the Decision Point to the Completion Point. In addition, high
corruption thwarts their process of completing all of the requirements. Lower institutional
quality, such as lower rule of law, also prolong the interim duration. However, since the inter-
action terms between interim debt relief and institutional value are statistically insignificant,
I do not conclude that there is moral hazard.
The second essay studies the spatial spillover effects of HIPC aid, membership, and length
of time in the program on real GDP per capita. My analysis yields negative results for all
three measures. HIPC debt relief amount and the interim period have negative direct effects
on real GDP per capita. Suggesting that their impacts are contained within the recipient
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country. However, HIPC membership has statistically significant indirect effect. This trans-
lates to spatial spillovers. When a country joins the HIPC Initiative, there is a potential
that it could harm the neighboring countries’ real GDP per capita.
The final essay reviews the HIPC Initiative accomplishments, or lack thereof, on institu-
tional quality. The initiative set institutional reform as one of the crucial trigger point for
reaching the Completion Point; hence, it makes sense for us to look for a positive change
in institutional quality after the member country exits the program. We use the Fraser
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index to measure economic institutions and the
Freedom House political rights index as a measure for political institutions. We find no
evidence of improved institutional quality in any aspect.
Overall, the findings suggest that being a member of the HIPC Initiative does not yield
many positive outcomes. The interim debt relief does not shorten the interim duration. There
are negative effects of being a HIPC member on real GDP per capita, and the effects spillover
to neighboring countries. Furthermore, the condition of structural reform to complete the
HIPC program does not seem to produce institutional changes. These results imply that the
Initiative is not monitoring these countries closely enough. The Initiative should implement
a stricter policy that would force member countries to do more to lift up their economic and
political quality. As institutional quality increases, it contribute towards reducing interim
duration and raising standard of living in HIPC members.
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